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CRIMINAL LAW: JUSTICE AFTER TRIAL
Terrence F. Kiely*
Professor Kiely reviews and analyzes in depth this survey year's
post-trial criminal law developments in the areas of sentencing, probation, probation revocation and the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. With
an eye toward the realities of prison litigation, he also has gone into and
through the recent in-roads on the "hands-off" doctrine and explores the
more essential administrative realm within which these decisions must
reside.
INTRODUCTION

HIS article will analyze recent Illinois cases in the field of

criminal law that fall within the broad range of post-conviction
developments. The topic is an extensive one and hence the discussion to follow will attempt to organize the decisions within sev-

eral basic post-conviction areas: sentencing, probation, probation revocation, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, and finally, recent developments regarding the constitutional rights of inmates incarcer-

ated in Illinois penitentiaries.

As much as is possible, an attempt

will be made to acquaint the reader with the overall decisional, ad-

ministrative or statutory context in which the more recent cases
chosen for analysis make their mark.
SENTENCING

Contemporaneous with the January 1, 1973, effective date of Il-

linois' new Unified Code of Corrections' questions arose as to the
applicability of the codes relaxed sentencing guidelines 2 to cases

brought to judgment prior to that date, but currently on appeal,
wherein the reviewing court is urged to reduce a sentence imposed
in excess of the new limits, pursuant to their power to reduce sen-

tences under Supreme Court Rule 615.1
*

Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law.

1. ILL. REV.
referred to as the
2. ILL. Rnv.
3. ILL. REV.

STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1001-1-1 to 1008-6-1 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter
new Code].
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (Supp. 1972).
STAT.

ch. 110A, § 615(b)(4) (1971).
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Section 1008-2-4 of the new Code provides in part:
If the offense being prosecuted has not reached the sentencing stage or
a final adjudication, then for purposes of sentencing, the sentences under

this act apply if they are less than under prior law upon which the prose4
cution was commenced.

In two companion cases, People v. Chupich,5 dealing with the interpretation of nearly identical language in the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act,6 and People v. Harvey,7 relating directly to section
1008-2-4, the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that for purposes of
the applicability of the new sentencing structures of both pieces of
legislation, a case has not been finally adjudicated, within the
meaning of the relevant sections, until the last direct appeal has been
decided or the time for the filing of such has expired. Hence, in cases
actually on appeal or still within the statutory time for appeal at the
effective date of the new code, the defendants are entitled to a reduction of any sentence imposed in excess of that provided for under
the new Code section 1005-8-1.
In Chupich, the defendant was convicted of the unlawful sale of
narcotics and, pursuant to the then extant Uniform Narcotic Drug
Act,8 was sentenced to a term of not less than twenty-five nor more
than sixty years in the penitentiary. On appeal, Chupich challenged his conviction proper, which was affirmed, and the excessive nature of his sentence in light of the less strict provisions of
the Illinois Controlled Substances Act 9 which became effective during the pendency of his appeal.
The State based its argument on two grounds: first, that the General Assembly intended that the new legislation be governed by
section 4 of the Statutory Construction Act, which states in part:
If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any provision
of new law, such provision may, by the consent of the party effected, be
applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect."'
4.
5.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1008-2-4 (Supp. 1972).
53 IlI. 2d 572, 295 N.E.2d 1 (1973).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56%, § 1601 (Supp. 1973).
7. 53 11. 2d 585, 294 N.E.2d 269 (1973).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 22-3 (1965).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1401-1412 (Supp. 1972)
16, 1971).
10. ILL. REV. STAT.ch. 131, § 4 (1971).

(effective on August
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The State cited in support of its argument the opinion of the Illinois
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Hanson," where, in relation
to the applicability of section 4 to the Criminal Code of 1961, it
was held that such "mitigation" only applied to judgments after
the new Code took effect.

In rejecting this argument, Justice Schaefer, speaking for the court
stated:
It is clear that the General Assembly did not intend the Statutory Construction Act to govern the imposition of penalties under the statutes now
before us. If it had, the provisions involved in this case would not have
12
been necessary, and would not have been enacted.

Thus, continued Justice Schaefer, the resolution of the issue really
turned on the meaning of the phrases "sentencing stage" or "final

adjudication."
On this point, the State argued that "final adjudication" in section
1008-2-4 actually meant final appealable order and that hence the
final judgment of the trial court, whether sentence or probation,

fixed the determinative date as to the applicability of the new Code.
In rejecting this analysis, Justice Schaefer noted that such reason-

ing led to the conclusion that "sentencing stage" and "final adjudication" were, in effect, synonomous terms,
ously not the intent of the legislature."
noted that section 1005-6-2(e) as well as
sions of the new Code refer to "sentences"

which result was obviIn addition, the court
numerous other provito probation.' 4 In con-

clusion, Justice Schaffer held:
We are of the opinion that "sentencing stage" and "final adjudication"
do not mean the same thing, and that the appellate courts have correctly
held that the penalties provided in the Controlled Substances Act are applicable to cases pending upon direct appeal. The same result will follow
under the Unified Code of Corrections.' 5
11. 28 Ill.
2d 322, 192N.E.2d 359 (1963).
12. 53 Ill. 2d at 583-84, 295 N.E.2d at 8.
13. This argument equates an interlocutory order which has been made
"final" for purposes of appeal with a "final adjudication." The two are
not equivalent. Under the State's analysis, either the reference to "the
sentencing stage" or the reference to "final adjudication" is redundant.
ld. at 584, 295 N.E.2d at 8.
14. The question of whether probation is a "punishment" for purposes of Supreme Court Rule 615 granting reviewing courts power to reduce punishments will
be discussed in depth later in this section. See text accompanying notes 34-55 infra.
15. 53 Ill. 2d at 584, 295 N.E.2d at 8. See also People v. Pickett, 54 I11.2d 280,
296 N.E.2d 856 (1973). The case was remanded to determine the proper sentence
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In People v. Harvey, 6 involving the proper sentencing limits following a conviction for aggravated assault, the supreme court addressed itself directly to section 1008-2-4 of the new Code. Fol.
lowing the ruling in Chupich, the court applied the new sentencing

provisions of section 1005-8-1 since the appeal was pending when
the new Code became effective on January 1, 1973.

Harvey was

remanded for a reduction of the minimum term imposed by the trial
7

court.1

Following the decisions of the supreme court in Chupich and
Harvey, the appellate courts have reduced sentences involving various crimes in a series of cases,' 8 several of which merit extended attention at this point. Two such cases, People v. Haynes 9 and
People v. Rheinhart,2 0 addressed themselves to the status of the
so-called "split sentence" rule under the new Code and to the problem of those currently incarcerated pursuant to that rule, in light
of the supreme court's decisions in Chupich and Harvey.
Under the authority of section 117-2 of the prior Criminal Code,2
since the record failed to clearly indicate the amount of substance involved, which
is a determining factor in the length of the sentence.
16. 53 Ill. 2d 585, 294 N.E.2d 269 (1973).
17. Section 1005-8-1, the general sentencing provision of the new Code, provides that for any class two or class three felony, such as aggravated assault, the
maximum term shall be any term in excess of one year and the minimum shall be
one year, unless the court determines that a higher sentence in light of the circumstances would be appropriate. However, the section specifically states that any
higher minimum term "shall not be greater than one third of the maximum term set
in that case by the court." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(4) (Supp. 1972).
The same applies to negotiated pleas for reduction purposes; see People v. Cole,
1111. App. 3d 412, 299 N.E.2d 394 (1973).
18. See, e.g., People v. McKemie, 13 I11.App. 3d 42, 299 N.E.2d 593 (1973)
(burglary); People v. Barker, 13 I11. App. 3d 349, 299 N.E.2d 365 (1973) (robbery); People v. Dalton, 12 Il. App. 3d 1097, 299 N.E.2d 352 (1973) (robbery);
People v. Evans, 12 I1. App. 3d 1036, 299 N.E.2d 364 (1973) (theft in excess of
$150); People v. Larkin, 12 Ill. App. 3d 429, 297 N.E.2d 746 (1973) (armed
robbery); People v. Buckham, 12 Ill. App. 3d 380, 297 N.E.2d 715 (1973) (involuntary manslaughter); People v. Burke, 12 Ill. App. 3d 374, 298 N.E.2d 180
(1973) (robbery); People v. Johnson, 12 Ill. App. 3d 326, 297 N.E.2d 601 (1973)
(attempted armed robbery); People v. Tomer, 11 111. App. 3d 152, 299 N.E.2d 18
(1973) (burglary); People v. Gargano, 10 Ill. App. 3d 957, 295 N.E.2d 342 (1973)
(burglary and armed violence); People v. Kovacivich, 10 Ill. App. 3d 797, 295
N.E.2d 33 (1973) (burglary); People v. Gregurich, 10 Ill. App. 3d 511, 294 N.E.2d
781 (1973) (aggravated battery).
19. 10 Ill. App. 3d 923, 295 N.E.2d 354 (1973).
20. 11 Ill. App. 3d 859, 296 N.E.2d 781 (1973).
21. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 117-2 (1971).
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it was permissible for a trial court to require a period of incarceration
of varying lengths as a condition of admission to probation. However, under section 1005-6-3(b)(1) of the new Code of corrections, the "split-sentence" is prohibited and a trial court may no
longer impose a period of imprisonment as a condition to receiving
probation.2 2 The council commentary to section 1005-6-3 (which
relates to the general conditions of probation and conditional discharge) reads as follows:
The use of the so-called split sentence under which the first part of the
sentence is served in the county jail is specifically prohibited except in the
limited situation where probation is used in conjunction with periodic imprisonment. The use of a term of imprisonment as a condition of probation destroys probation as a means of immediate restoration to the community and undoes the ties which the offender may have there. 23

In People v. Haynes,24 the defendant, following a plea of guilty
to forgery, was sentenced to probation for a five year period, the
first year of which was to be served at the Illinois State Penal Farm at
Vandalia. Relying on appellate decisions which had anticipated the
previously discussed supreme court rulings in Chupich and Harvey,
and noting the prohibition of section 1005-6-3, the court modified
the order of probation, at defendant's urging, to eliminate the period
of imprisonment.2 5
In a more unique opinion, the Third District Appellate Court
in the case of People v. Rheinhart,26 decided shortly after Haynes,
likewise eliminated a period of imprisonment imposed as a condition for admission to probation by the trial court. The defendant,
following a plea of guilty to a charge of possession of cannabis,
was sentenced to a period of probation, the first six months to be
served at Vandalia. Here however, the court noted that the language of section 1008-2-427 provided for the application of the new
22. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3(b)(1) (Supp. 1972).
23. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (council commentary). Increased use by trial courts of periodic imprisonment, provided for in section 1005-7-1, can be anticipated, as a means of accomplishing a "split-sentence" in
effect in cases where such would have been imposed under prior law.
24. 10 Ill. App. 3d 923, 295 N.E.2d 354 (1973).
25. "Here defendant has, before his release, served approximately four months
of the one year imposed, and we consider in light of the public policy expressed in
the Code that further incarceration is not required in this case." Id. at 926,
295 N.E.2d at 356.
26. 11 Ill. App. 3d 859, 296 N.E.2d 781 (1973).
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1008-2-4 (Supp. 1972).
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sentencing guidelines to cases on appeal only if the sentence under
the new Code would be less than that provided under former law.
Since the possible penalty would actually be increased under the
new provisions of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, 28 the court
felt that the new Code technically did not apply. Nevertheless, noting the obvious public policy behind the prohibition against the
split sentence, the court modified the order so as to eliminate the
29
period of imprisonment.
The Rheinhart court's general quandry as to the possible range
of increased penalties under the new Code in some instances, as
affecting its application to cases pending on appeal on its effective
date was raised and settled in two very recent decisions. In People
v. Smith"° and People v. Burke,"' it was held that for purposes of
application of the new Code's sentencing parameters to cases on appeal at its effective date, the sentence actually imposed is the determinent of the lesser sentence provision of section 1008-2-4.11
PROBATION

Before leaving the general topic of the power of appellate courts
to reduce sentences pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615 (or, per
Chupich and Harvey, their statutory responsibility in applicable
cases), several collateral and important decisions dealing with the
power of such courts to reduce a penitentiary sentence to one of probation must be discussed.
There is no constitutional right to probation. 3 In fact, it has
been consistently held that the decision to grant or deny it is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court while the scope of review
has been generally limited to scrutiny of any alleged abuse of
28.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56/, § 1601 (Supp. 1973).
29. "[R]ehabilitation of defendant does not require that we rigidly adhere to
prior concepts, but in fact, calls for application of the spirit of the change and modification as expressed in the Unified Code of Corrections to eliminate the imposition of incarceration in this cause." 11 IMI.App. 3d at 862, 296 N.E.2d at 783.
30. 10 Il. App. 3d 501, 296 N.E.2d 15 (1973).
31. 12 Ill. App. 3d 374, 298 N.E.2d 180 (1973).
32. 10 Ill. App. 3d at 506-07, 296 N.E.2d at 18-19; 12 Il1. App. 3d at 377-78,
298 N.E.2d at 182.
33. See People v. Molz, 415 Ill. 183, 113 N.E.2d 314 (1953).
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Regardless, the appellate courts in several in-

stances have reduced penitentiary sentences to probation pursuant

to Supreme Court Rule 615 by interpreting the term "punishment"
3 5
to include probation.
The part of Supreme Court Rule 615 which is relevant to this discussion reads as follows:
(b)

Powers of the Reviewing Court.
may:
(4)

On appeal the reviewing court

3 6

reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court.

The Supreme Court of Illinois in the recent case of People ex rel.
Ward v. Moran,37 has held that for purposes of the power of an appellate court to reduce a sentence, the term "punishment" in Rule

615 does not include probation and their power in this regard is
limited to reviewing a denial of probation upon allegations of abuse
of discretion by the trial court.3 8 Prior to an analysis of the Moran
case, however, attention should be given to a recent second district
decision, People v. Velez, 9 inasmuch as it anticipated the issue
dealt with in Moran and will thus shed some light on the rationale
of that ruling.
In Velez, following a conviction for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs (Deslental and Desoxyn), the defendant was denied
probation and sentenced to six months at the Vandalia prison farm.
34. See, e.g., People v. Saiken, 49 Ill. 2d 504, 275 N.E.2d 381 (1971); People
v. Carpenter, 1 Ill. 2d 347, 115 N.E.2d 761 (1953). A very recent amendment to
section 1005-5-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections limits the court's power to
grant probation in certain instances:
(d)
When a defendant is convicted of a felony or misdemeanor, the
court may sentence such defendant to:
(1)
a period of prohibition or conditional discharge except in cases of
murder, rape, armed violence, armed robbery, violation of sections 401(a),
402(a), 405(a) or 407 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or violation of Section 9 of the Cannabis Control Act;...
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3 (Supp. 1972).
35. See, e.g., People v. Steadman, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 280 N.E.2d 17 (1972);
People v. Palmeri, 2 111. App. 3d 934, 275 N.E.2d 486 (1971); People v. McClendon, 130 Ill. App. 2d 852, 265 N.E.2d 207 (1970).
36. ILL. REV. STAT.ch. ll0A, § 615(b) (4) (1971).
37. 54 111. 2d 552, 301 N.E.2d 300 (1973).
38. Thus the only option the appellate court has is to order a new hearing to
determine if such abuse is found to have existed in the initial denial. See People v.
Baumgarten, 13 LIl. App. 3d 189, 300 N.E.2d 561 (1973).
39. 6 Ill. App. 3d 466, 285 N.E.2d 251 (1972).
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On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his probation request. The majority rejected
the defendant's argument but implied that in a proper case it had
the authority under Supreme Court Rule 615 to reduce a penitentiary sentence to probation. Justice Moran, concurring in the specific result in the case, addressed himself squarely to the underlying
issue.
Citing an early Illinois Supreme Court decision,40 he argued that
probation is the suspension of a sentence and the phrase "sentenced
to probation" is simply an erroneous result of common usage.
While penalty and punishment are synonymous terms, he continued,
punishment and probation are not:
after a judgment of guilt, a sentence is the pronouncement of punishment. Since, by its definition, probation is the suspension of punishment, it follows that one cannot be sentenced to probation. .

.

.

Prop-

erly, one is "allowed probation" or "admitted to probation."
While Rule (615)(b)(4) empowers this court to reduce the punishment,
we are not empowered to void the punishment after a judgment of guilty.
To order probation on appeal would suspend and therefore effectively void
any punishment imposed.

41

The analysis set forth by Justice Moran was the focal point of the
42
supreme court's decision in People ex rel. Ward v. Moran.
In the case of People v. Broverman43 the Fifth District Appellate
Court affirmed a forgery and theft conviction but vacated concurrent penitentiary terms of one to three and one to five years imposed
by the trial court and ordered that the defendant be admitted to probation. The Moran case arose from an original writ of mandamus
by the State's Attorney of Christian County to the Illinois Supreme
Court seeking an order directing the fifth district to vacate that
portion of their order admitting Broverman to probation. The supreme court, while denying the writ on the ground that the mandamus was not the proper remedy, granted the substantive relief desired, pursuant to their rarely used supervisory authority under ar44
ticle VI, section 16 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
40.

People v. Featherstone, 194 Ill. 325, 62 N.E. 684 (1902).

41.
42.
43.

6 Ill. App. 3d at 469-70, 285 N.E.2d at 253 (emphasis by the court).
54 111. 2d 552, 301 N.E.2d 300 (1973).
4 Ill. App. 3d 929, 282 N.E.2d 279 (1972).

44.

ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (1970).
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The court, speaking through Justice Kluczynski, held that Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) was not intended to grant a court of
review the power to reduce a penitentiary sentence to probation.
Referring to the law applicable to the case, section 117-1 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963," he noted that probation is
left to the sound discretion of the trial court and that the scope of
review has traditionally been limited to questions of abuse of such
discretion. The earlier decisions positing the reduction power
urged by the responden 6 were disregarded by the court on the
basis that research had disclosed no supreme court ruling having
any precedential value in that regard. After a brief discussion
of the relevant statutes and of the individuality of consideration
inherent in the concept of probation, Justice Kluczynski stated:
Probation and imprisonment have been classified as penal sanctions

47
[citations omitted], but they are qualitatively distinct.

In answer to the respondent's argument that section 11 of article
I of the 1970 Illinois Constitution 4 gave appellate courts the implied
power to reduce penitentiary sentences to probation, the court noted:
There is no indication that the italicized portion of section 11 is to be given
greater consideration than that which establishes that the seriousness of

the offense shall determine the penalty. Nor does section 11 specifically
empower a reviewing court to grant probation after the trial court has
49
imposed a penitentiary sentence.

Pursuant to its ruling, the court, under its supervisory powers, ordered the appellate court to vacate that portion of its judgment ordering probation and to determine solely the issue of abuse of discretion by the trial court.
The new Illinois Unified Code of Corrections, in effect on the date
of the Moran decision, is replete with references to probation as a
"sentence," and the council commentary to section 1005-6-1, the
45. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 117-1 (1969). The court noted that at the date of
decision the new Illinois Unified Code of Corrections was currently in effect.
46.

See note 35, supra.

47. 54 Ill. 2d at 556, 301 N.E.2d at 302. See People ex rel. Barrett v. Bardens,
394 Ill. 511, 517, 68 N.E.2d 710, 713 (1946) where the court stated: "A sentence
to imprisonment in the penitentiary cannot be synonymous with a grant of proba-

tion entitling a convicted defendant to escape a penalty of imprisonment."
48. "All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the
offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship."
49. 54 Ill. 2d at 556-57, 301 N.E.2d at 302.
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general probation provision of the new Code specifically states that
"[p]robation under the Code is a sentence, not the suspension of a
sentence as under former law." 5
A sentence is defined in the new Code in section 1005-1-1911 as
"the disposition imposed by the court on a convicted defendant."
In the council commentary to this definitional section it is stated:
The word "disposition" is substituted for the word "punishment" in
this definition because "disposition" is a broader word which includes
"punishment." Otherwise this follows former law. 52

Section 1005-1-18 defines probation as "a sentence or adjudication
of conditional and revocable release under the supervision of a probation officer. '53 Section 1006-5-3(d) provides that when a defendant is convicted of a felony or misdemeanor, the court may
sentence such defendant to a period of probation.5 4 Paragraph
(g) of the same section provides that in "no case shall an offender
be eligible for a disposition of probation . . . for a Class 1 felony

committed while he was serving a term of probation or conditional
discharge for a felony." 5 Finally, section 1005-6-4(a) of the
new Code refers to a sentence of probation when referring to the
tolling of probationary time upon the issuance of a revocation warrant.
Thus it appears that regardless of the classificatory and substantive changes relative to probation in the new Code, the supreme
court, as stated in Moran, does not deem probation to be "punishment," at least insofar as rule 615(b)(4) is concerned.
A final, corollary decision to be discussed involved in the probation-sentence-punishment dialogue, is People v. Gentry," which
addresses the issue of whether a defendant admitted to probation,
upon revocation is entitled, on request, to a hearing in aggravation
50. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (council commentary).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-1-19 (Supp. 1972).
52. ILL. AN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-1-19 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (council commentary).
53.
54.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-1-18 (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3 (Supp. 1972).

55.
56.

Id. § 1005-5-3(g) (emphasis added).
5 IUI. App. 3d 1088, 284 N.E.2d 428 (1972).
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and mitigation5 7 of the charges stemming from the revocation prior
to receiving a penitentiary sentence.
Gentry, following a plea of guilty to a charge of burglary, was
granted probation the same day for a five year period. Approximately one year later his probation was revoked and a penitentiary
sentence of two to four years was imposed. The defendant's request
for a hearing in aggravation and mitigation was denied.
The First District Appellate Court, speaking through Judge
Leighton, in response to the State's argument that the defendant
had, in effect, had such a hearing prior to the entry of the order of
probation, stated:
Sentence, in the meaning of these words, is the pronouncement of the
penalty which the law imposes as a consequence of guilt. (Citations omitted) Probation, which the court considered after defendant pled guilty,
is not a sentence. [Citations omitted] It is generally said that an order
admitting a defendant to probation is a suspension of the sentence. (Citations omitted) Therefore, what the trial judge considered in determin-

ing whether to grant defendant probation was not evidence "[flor the
purpose of determining the sentence

. ."

year later.5 8

which was imposed almost a

Accordingly, the case was remanded for purposes of conducting a
hearing in aggravation and mitigation.
Even in light of the substantive and definitional changes regarding the status of probation in the new Code, the decision of the
court in Gentry may well stand, thus requiring a re-examination of
the substantive nature of the two types of hearings involved, as well
as the relevant data to be considered in each instance.
The disparity in interpretation of the concept of probation in the
above instances highlights the continuing need for complete and
definitive legislative guidelines as to both the overall intent of the
drafters of the new Code in making the changes discussed and
their place in the entire complex of sentence related statutory and
case law. The possible impact of the ruling in the Moran case is
especially unfortunate in light of the obvious attempt made by the
drafters to recognize the realities of being placed on probation. A
57. "After a determination of guilt, a hearing shall be held to impose the sentence. At the hearing the court shall . . . consider evidence and information offered by the parties in aggravation and mitigation." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-4-1(a)(3) (Supp. 1972).
58. 5 Il1. App. 3d at 1090, 284 N.E.2d at 429.
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theoretical distinction between "probation" and "punishment" for
purposes of Supreme Court Rule 615 only lends further credence to
the position that probation is a mere technicality allowing the guilty
to escape "punishment."
PROBATION REVOCATION

Under the new Illinois Unified Code of Corrections, the provisions for the granting and revocation of probation are set forth in
article 6, section 1005-6-1 to section 1005-6-4.19 The decision to
allow probation, as indicated above, lies solely within the discretion
of the trial court. The new Code adds the caveat that probation
should not be granted in cases where imprisonment would be necessary for the protection of the public; the offender is in need of
correctional treatment that can be most effectively provided by a
sentence of imprisonment; or if probation would deprecate the seri°
ousness of the offense. 60
The grounds for probation revocation under the new Code are essentially the same as under prior law,6 ' namely, the violation of any
criminal statute6 2 of any jurisdiction and the noncompliance with
any conditions imposed by the court or the probation department.6" While the most common basis for the revocation of probation continues to be the commission of another offense,6 4 several
recent decisions have affirmed revocations based on violations of imposed conditions. 5
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-6-1 to 1005-6-4 (Supp. 1972).
60. Id. § 1005-6-1(a)(1-3). See also note 34 supra.
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 117-2(a) and 117-3(d) (1967).
62. Section 117-2(a) read "any penal statute or ordinance" of any jurisdiction
(emphasis added).
63. In addition, the new Code in §§ 1005-6-3(b)(1-10), sets out conditions
which may be imposed by the trial court.
64. See People v. Crowell, 53 Ill. 2d 477, 292 N.E.2d 721 (1973) (theft);
People v. Hall, 10 IMi.App. 3d 1011, 295 N.E.2d 545 (1973) (robbery); People v.
King, 10 Ill. App. 3d 847, 294 N..E.2d 300 (1973) (burglary); People v. Shadowens,
10 Il. App. 3d 450, 294 N.E.2d 107 (1973) (aggravated assault); People v. Williams, 10 I1. App. 3d 428, 294 N.E.2d 61 (1973) (burglary); People v. Woodson,
10 Ill. App. 3d 79, 293 N.E.2d 457 (1973)
(criminal damage to property);
People v. Witherspoon, 9 Ill. App. 3d 317, 292 N.E.2d 202 (1972) (attempted aggravated assault); People v. McCullough, 5 Ill. App. 3d 796, 283 N.E.2d 926 (1972)
(out of state offense).
65. See People v. Dawes, 52 Ill. 2d 121, 284 N.E.2d 629 (1972) (failure to
make restitution); People v. Jones, 12 Ill. App. 3d 958, 299 N.E.2d 336 (1973)
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The more important issues raised in the recent probation revoca-

tion cases concern the standard of proof and procedures to be adhered to in revocation hearings.

The new Code provides in sec-

tion 1005-6-4, as under prior law, that a hearing on revocation will
be had upon a petition by the probation authorities and that bail

may be allowed during the pendency of the action.0.6 It is also
specifically provided that the state shall have the burden of going forward and proving the violation by a preponderance of the eviof confrontation,
dence, with the alleged violator having the right
6
counsel.
by
representation
and
cross-examination
It is important to note that when the alleged violation constitutes
the commission of another offense, the State need not establish that

the probationer has been indicted, prosecuted or convicted. The
revocation may be effected by proof of the new crime by a preponderance of the evidence. 68
In January of 1973, the Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of
People v. Crowell,69 removed any doubts as to the standard of proof
in probation revocation hearings. The defendant had been placed on
probation following a plea of guilty to theft. He was later charged
(failure to report); People v. Perez, 12 Ill. App. 3d 892, 299 N.E.2d 355 (1973)
(failure to report); People v. Hardy, 8 Ill. App. 3d 854, 291 N.E.2d 242 (1973)
(presence in place where liquor sold and failure to pay court costs); People v.
Wade, 8 Ill. App. 3d 774, 290 N.E.2d 329 (1973) (failure to report); People v.
Whitney, 7 Ill. App. 3d 92, 287 N.E.2d 33 (1972) (intoxication); People v. Harris,
6 111. App. 3d 487, 285 N.E.2d 583 (1972) (failure to report).
66. It also provides that a summons, in addition to a warrant may issue to the
alleged violator which shall have the effect of tolling the running of the probationary period. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-4 (Supp. 1972).
67. The source of these provisions are based upon evolved standards in relation
to such hearings. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) and the American
Bar Associations Probation Standards, sections 5.1-5.4.
68. A probation violation proceeding and a criminal proceeding are independent of one another. A defendant need not be indicted, prosecuted or
convicted of the offenses which are the basis for the revocation of probation.
This court adheres to the rule that in probation revocation hearings,
proof of violation of probation will be established by a preponderance of
the evidence.
People v. Witherspoon, 9 Ill. App. 3d 317, 320, 292 N.E.2d 202, 204 (1973). See
also People v. Latham, 132 Ill. App. 2d 823, 270 N.E.2d 563 (1971); People v.
Tempel, 131 111. App. 2d 955, 268 N.E.2d 875 (1971); People v. Smith, 105 Ill.
App. 2d 14, 245 N.E.2d 13 (1969); People v. White, 98 Ill. App. 2d 1, 239 N.E.2d
854 (1968); People v. Morgan, 55 Ill. App. 2d 157, 204 N.E.2d 314 (1965).
69. 53 Ill. 2d 447, 292 N.E.2d 721 (1973).
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with a similar offense and, on the basis of evidence produced at a
subsequent hearing, his probation was revoked. On appeal, he
challenged the revocation on the basis that his commission of the
new offense was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The supreme court, speaking through Justice Davis held:
Since this court has never before ruled on the precise question of what
the quantum of proof should be in a probation revocation proceeding, and
in absence of any statutory provisions therefor [citation omitted], we
hold that a violation of the conditions of probation must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. We note, moreover, that the General
Assembly has specifically incorporated this standard in the new Illinois
70
code of corrections ....

As to the adequacy of evidence presented at the hearing, the court
reiterated a long-held position that a finding of a violation will not
be disturbed merely on the basis of a conflict of evidence. Thus

the Crowell decision and the new Code appear to have settled any
issues regarding the standard of proof at probation revocation proceedings.7 1

On the issue of the sufficiency of proof in each instance underlying the probation revocation, as opposed to the proper overall
evidentiary standard, two cases, People v. Kaplan72 and People v.
Johnson, 3 merit brief attention.
In Kaplan, following a plea of guilty to a charge of aggravated

battery, the defendant was placed on five years probation. Approximately two years later, he pled guilty to charges of battery and re-

sisting arrest and was placed on three years probation. Subsequently
upon petition, the defendant's first probationary term was revoked,
in violation of an agreement to the contrary with the State's Attor70. Id. at 451, 292 N.E.2d at 723. The court also noted that, as opposed to
earlier law, appellate court reviews of probation revocations were no longer final.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 117-3(e) (1971). ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 604
(b) (1971).
71. See, e.g., People v. King, 10 I11. App. 3d 847, 294 N.E.2d 300 (1973);
People v. Shadowens, 10 I11.App. 3d 450, 294 N.E.2d 107 (1973); People v. Woodson, 10 I11.App. 3d 79, 293 N.E.2d 457 (1973). Shadowens held that the sentencing
provisions of the new Code were applicable to appeals following probation revocation and sentencing. See also People v. Birch, 12 I11. App. 3d 761, 299 N.E.2d 85
(1973).
72. 7 II1.App. 3d 155, 287 N.E.2d 246 (1972).
73. 10 11. App. 3d 537, 294 N.E.2d 700 (1973).
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ney, due to his plea of guilty to the later charge.74 Following the
revocation, the battery and resisting arrest convictions were set
aside by the trial court and the defendant was allowed to withdraw
his pleas of guilty. In the instant case, ,the defendant urged that
since the sole basis of the probation revocation were the now vacated
guilty pleas, the revocation and penitentiary sentence could not
stand.
The court, stressing the need for adequate proof of the underlying
charge by a preponderance of the evidence, concluded:
In the instant case, probation was revoked on the sole ground that defendant had been convicted of criminal offenses. No testimony was produced as to the facts of the alleged crimes.

The vacatur in the Municipal

Division of the convictions and the withdrawal of the guilty pleas vitiated
75
the basis of the revocation order.

Accordingly, the court ordered the vacatur of the revocation order
and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the petition for revocation.
In an analogous situation in People v. Johnson,76 the court
again stressed the necessity of proof of the underlying charge, where
that is the basis for a revocation request, by a preponderance of the
evidence. The defendant, following a plea of guilty to a charge
of criminal damage to property, was placed on probation, for a
one year period. A short time later, a rule to show cause was requested and received by the State on the basis that the defendant
had been charged with the unlawful use of weapons and attempted
arson. At the hearing, the evidence against the defendant mainly
consisted of the uncorroborated testimony of a police officer placing the defendant at the scene, which evidence was contradicted by
defense witnesses. On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and pointed out that the underlying charges
themselves had, in one form or another, been dismissed. The
trial court revoked the probation and sentenced the defendant to
thirty-one days in the House of Corrections.
74. As mentioned, this was done on the ground that the defendant had pled
guilty to the later charges on the promise that his conviction would not be used as a
basis for the revocation of his earlier probation. Upon being brought to the attention of the trial court, the above order was entered.
75. 7 Ill. App. 3d at 157, 287 N.E.2d at 247.
76.

10 Ill. App. 3d 537, 294 N.E.2d 700 (1973).
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The court, after ruling that the testimony itself was not sufficient,
also stressed the dismissal of the charges7 7 as an additional basis for
the reversal of the revocation order:
A probationer is entitled to know the nature of the charges against
him. [Citation omitted]. The before mentioned complaints on which the
petition for a rule to show cause was based had been dismissed on the
State's own motion. It now appears that all the charges have been dismissed either by the State or by the Grand Jury for want of evidence. The
charge against the defendant was not proved by a preponderance of evi78
dence and accordingly the judgment will be reversed.

Thus, where the basis of the revocation petition is the commission

or conviction of a subsequent offense, a probation revocation, without more, cannot stand where the underlying charge or conviction
has been dismissed or vacated.79
An additional issue, that of the Illinois Supreme Court Rule 40280
admonishments necessary to be given a defendant upon the admission of charges or conditions violations (which are the basis of the
rule to show cause), was addressed by the courts over the past sur-

vey year and will be briefly analyzed at this point. Adhering to the
earlier supreme court decision in People v. Pier,8 the Fourth District Appellate Court held, in the cases of People v. Bryan8 2 and
People v. Watkins,88 that where such admissions are made, the ad-

monishments required by Supreme Court Rule 402 prior to the
acceptance of a guilty plea in criminal trials must be given probationers. 84
77. The Cook County Grand Jury had entered a "no bill" in regard to the
charges. The State moved to nolle the attempted arson charge and eventually had
the unlawful use of weapons charge stricken.
78. 10 Ill. App. 3d at 539, 294 N.E.2d at 702.
79. The revocation of probation on the basis of charges eventually dismissed is an
all too frequent occurrence throughout the United States.
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 402 (1971).
81. 51 Ill. 2d 96, 281 N.E.2d 289 (1972).
82. 5 I11.App. 3d 1006, 284 N.E.2d 706 (1972). The petition also included a
minor criminal violation, which the court considered improper since it had been disposed of prior to the probationary period at issue.
83. 10 Ill. App. 3d 875, 295 N.E.2d 546 (1973).
84. Since the results of a probation revocation may be a deprivation of
liberty and, consequently, as serious as the original determination of
guilt, we agree . . . that due process of law requires that a defendant
charged with having violated his probation be entitled to a conscientious
judicial determination of the charge according to accepted and well recognized procedural methods. . . . Justice demands that he also be entitled to
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However, in a corollary case, People v. Warship,85 the Second
District Appellate Court has held that in a criminal case, a defendant
need not be admonished as to the effect that a guilty plea to the primary charge would have on such a defendant's current probationary status. In rejecting arguments as to the trial court's inadequate
admonition in that regard, the court stated:
There is no authority, either in the rules or the case law, that an accused be admonished as to the possible effect of a plea of guilty on his
probationary status in relation to another case. It is inconceivable to us
that any person on probation would be unaware that a subsequent felony
conviction would be grounds for revocation and therefore we are of the
86
opinion that it is not necessary that an accused be so informed.

Another aspect of probation revocation hearings, that of the reasonableness of a delay in holding the hearing following the issuance
of a warrant as affecting the jurisdiction of the issuing court to order
revocation, merits discussion, in light of two recent cases addressing
the issue.
In People v. Dawes,17 the defendant, following a plea of guilty to
a charge of obtaining money and goods by means of a confidence
game, was admitted to probation for a five year period with one condition being that of restitution. Subsequently the probationary period was extended by two years. On the last day of the total period a
petition urging revocation was filed with the court while the defendant was in open court. Due to a series of postponements entered
to allow the defendant an opportunity to raise the required restitution funds, the actual hearing was held two years following the revocation petition.
Based upon section 117-3(b) of the old probation statute which
provided that "[w]hen a warrant is issued the court shall within a
reasonable time after the apprehension of the probationer conduct a
heaing . . . ,,ss Dawes argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction
the protection of the same due-process requirements which pertain to pleas
of guilty when he waives his right to a judicial determination of the charge
that he violated his probation and confesses or admits the charges of the
revocation petition.
People v. Pier, 51 Ill. 2d 96, 100, 281 N.E.2d 289, 291 (1972).
85. 6 111. App. 3d 461, 285 N.E.2d 224 (1972).
86. Id. at 465, 285 N.E.2d at 228.
87. 52 Ill.
2d 121, 284 N.E.2d 629 (1972).
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 117-3 (1965). The new Code, in the corresponding section, section 1005-6-4, makes no mention of reasonable time.
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due to the two year delay. In rejecting the defendant's jurisdictional
argument the supreme court stated:
It appears from the record that these continuances were to enable the
defendant to make restitution to avoid probation revocation. Although
the actual revocation occurred more than two years after the original rule
to show cause was entered, in view of the circumstances we do not consider this to be unreasonable.89

In People v. Williams,0 the question of the loss of jurisdiction by
the revoking court due to an unreasonable delay between issuance
of the probation revocation warrant and the actual hearing date,
was raised with reference to the applicability of the 120 day trial
rule.9 l Williams, following a plea of guilty to burglary, was placed
on probation for a five year period. Subsequently, a petition for
revocation was filed due to the defendant's failure to report after the
transfer of his probation to another county. Williams was arrested
in a third county and pled guilty to burglary. The delay between
the original petition, later amended to include the burglary conviction as additional revocation grounds, and the actual hearing was
approximately fifteen months.
The defendant argued that such was an unreasonable delay, violative of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution as implemented by Illinois' 120 day rule.
In response, the court first noted that the issuance of a warrant for
violation within the probationary period tolls the running of the
period and thus is sufficient to maintain the court's jurisdiction.
With reference to the "reasonable time" provision of the relevant
probation statute, the court stated:
The court may lose the power to conduct a hearing on the issue of the
alleged violation of probation if it does not proceed within a reasonable
time after the apprehension of the probationer [citation omitted]. We
cannot agree with defendant's theory, however, that the 120 day statute
governing trials is to be imparted even by analogy into the statutory
scheme for probation violation hearings. The legislature has not seen fit
89. 52 Ill. 2d at 124-25, 284 N.E.2d at 631. The court also held that the incarceration of Dawes for failing to make restitution was not in conflict with recent
United States Supreme Court cases relating to the imprisonment of indigents unable
to pay a fine, inasmuch as he was clearly not indigent. See also People v. Baumgarten, 13 Ill. App. 3d 189, 300 N.E.2d 561 (1973).
90. 10 Ill. App. 3d 428, 294 N.E.2d 61 (1973).
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5(a) (1971).
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to treat trials and revocation hearings the same way [citations omitted];
and the courts have likewise recognized distinctions between trial and
92
probation revocation hearings.

In response to the defendant's attempt to distinguish an earlier
decision," wherein a seventeen month delay was deemed reasonable, on the basis that the probation statute there under scrutiny
had no such provision, the court stated:
We cannot agree that under the former statute a hearing could be indefinitely postponed, limited only by the period of probation. We think the
former statute also was subject to the constitutional right of a defendant
in a probation revocation hearing to constitutional protections [citations
omitted]. The present statute specifying a reasonable time for the hearing is the expression of the constitutional protection which was implied
94
in former section 789.1.

Presumably, this rationale will apply to future interpretations of section 1005-6-4 of the new Code which omits any reference to time. 95
Lastly, in People v. Harris,9 6 a case unrelated to the above probation topics, the Fifth District Appellate Court decided, prior to the
effective date of the new Code, that, upon revocation, the probationer is not entitled to credit on a penitentiary sentence for time
served on probation prior to the act constituting the violation. It
should be noted, however, that the new Code, in section 1005-6-4(h)
does provide a crediting provision. 7 Presumably such credit, as in
cases of parole revocations, will be limited to the time spent prior
to the act that precipitated the revocation.9
92.
93.
94.

10 Ill. App. 3d at 430, 294 N.E.2d at 63.
People v. Kostaken, 16 Ill. App. 2d 395, 148 N.E.2d 615 (1958).
10 Ill. App. 3d at 430-31, 294 N.E.2d at 63.
95. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-4 (Supp. 1972).
96. 6 Ill. App. 3d 487-88, 285 N.E.2d 583 (1972): "The Illinois Revised
Statutes make no provision for credit for time or probation when that probation is
therefore without merit."
97. "Time served on probation or conditional discharge shall be credited
against a sentence of imprisonment or periodic imprisonment." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-6-4(h) (Supp. 1972).
98. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-9(a)(3)(i) (Supp. 1973), where the
Code, in referring to recommitment following parole revocation states:
the recommitment shall be for that portion of the imposed maximum term
of imprisonment or confinement which has not been served at the time
of parole, less the time elapsed between the parole of the person and the
commission of the violation for which parole was revoked . . . [Emphasis
added].
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POST CONVICTION HEARING ACT-BURDEN ON PETITIONER

The following section of this article will discuss recent cases
dealing with several important aspects of the Illinois Post-Conviction
Hearing Act.9 9 Attention will be given to the burden on the petitioner, issues cognizable within the act and the topic of waiver and
res judicata of issues due to the pendency of a direct appeal in the
same case. This section will be followed by an analysis of recent
decisions discussing the duties of appointed counsel with respect
to proceedings under the act.
Section 1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides in part:
Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceeding which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial
of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or the State of
Illinois or both may institute a proceeding under this Article. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing . . . a petition . . . verified by
affidavit. 1 00

Section 2 provides:
The petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evdence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached. 1 01

Pursuant to this statutory charge, the courts have continued to routinely dismiss actions initiated under the Act where the petition was
unsupported in one or all of the above respects. Simple allegations
or conclusions as to the violation of the petitioner's constitutional
rights are not deemed sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. 10 2
However, in several important recent decisions, the courts have
relaxed the rigidity of the statutory requirements where the pro se
petition was mis-labeled and hence summarily dismissed, but upon
99. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 et seq. (1971). For a thorough study of
the nature and procedures pursuant to the Act, see Haddad, Collateral Attack on
Convictions, ILL. CRIM. PRAC.: ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., ch. 15

(1972).
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (1971).
101. Id. at § 122-2.
102. See People v. Farnsley, 53 Ill. 2d 537, 293 N.E.2d 600 (1973); People v.
Thigpen, 12 Ill. App. 3d 210, 298 N.E.2d 193 (1973); People v. Huckson, 10 Ill.
App. 3d 996, 295 N.E.2d 585 (1973); People v. Doyle, 10 ill. App. 3d 145, 294
N.E.2d 16 (1973); People v. Bennett, 9 Ill. App. 2d 332, 292 N.E.2d 159 (1972);
People v. Carter, 9 Il. App. 3d 80, 291 N.E.2d 266 (1972); People v. Mattox,
8 I11.App. 3d 768, 291 N.E.2d 253 (1972); People v. Allison, 8 Ill. App. 3d 161,
289 N.E.2d 195 (1972); People v. Westbrook, 5 Ill. App. 3d 970, 284 N.E.2d 695
(1972); People v. Maims, 5 Ill. App. 3d 679, 283 N.E.2d 909 (1972).
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closer examination of its substantive content would have warranted
at least initial consideration as a post-conviction petition.
In People v. Mass, 0 3 the defendant, following a plea of guilty to
murder and a hearing in aggravation and mitigation, was sentenced
to the penitentiary for a period of ten to fifteen years. Five months
later he filed a petition for a "re-Hearing in aggravation and mitigation." The trial court appointed the Public Defender to represent the defendant in "post-conviction matters." Following a statement by petitioner's counsel at the hearing that no issue other than
the propriety of the sentence could be found in defendant's petition,
the court denied a re-hearing. The issue on appeal was whether the
mis-labeled petition was in effect a post-conviction petition pursuant
to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, requiring counsel to comply
with Supreme Court Rule 6514 (c), relative to the duties of appointed
10
counsel in such proceedings.
After reiterating the requirements of section 122-2 of the Act,
as to the need for supportive documents, the court, noting that upon
sentencing the trial court lost jurisdiction over the sentence and
commitment and that counsel had been appointed for "post-conviction matters," concluded that the only way defendant's petition
could have been considered was as one initiated under the Act.
The court ruled:
While the pro se "Motion for Rehearing on aggravation and mitigation"
did not allege any constitutional violations of defendant's right, we feel

that the ends of justice would be best served by treating the same as a
post-conviction petition. .

.

. No useful purpose would be served by re-

quiring defendant to file a new post-conviction petition.

This being the

case, appointed counsel should have complied with [Supreme Court Rule
05
651(c)].1

Two additional cases, relating to the mis-labeling of a post-conviction petition as one seeking a "writ of habeas corpus," shed
more light on the interpretation of section 122-2 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
In People v. Cobb,' °6 decided by the Second District Appellate
Court, the defendant, following a conviction for rape and aggravated
103.

9 I11.App. 3d 67, 292 N.E.2d 33 (1973).

104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 615(c) (1971). This Rule requires a showing
of minimal contacts with the prisoner and an examination of the record of the case.
105.
106.

9 Ill. App. 3d at 68-69, 292 N.E.2d at 34.
8 Ill. App. 3d at 1081, 290 N.E.2d 610 (1972).
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kidnaping, filed a pro se petition labeled "petition of habeas corpus" which set out several alleged constitutional violations during
the course of his trial. Counsel was appointed. Following the
State's argument that none of the points raised in the petition went
to the lack of jurisdicion of the trial court, as required by the Habeas
Corpus Act, 10 7 the petition was dismissed without a hearing.
The court agreed with the argument of the State as to the jurisdictional basis of actions under the Habeas Corpus Act. They also
noted that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act requires that counsel
be appointed upon request and that his conduct be in accordance
with Supreme Court Rule 651(c). However, the court continued
that though the Illinois Supreme Court has held that a trial court may
treat a petition designated as one seeking a writ of habeas corpus as
one brought pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, they are
not required to do so. 10 8 Accordingly the dismissal was affirmed
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 65, § 22 (1971). The remedy of state habeas corpus
is not available to review errors of a non-jurisdictional nature even though they
involve claims of a denial of constitutional right.
Also, counsel need not be appointed to indigents under the statute:
§ 22. Causes for discharge when in custody on process of court
If it appear that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any
court legally constituted, he can be discharged only for some of the following causes:
1. Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to
the matter, place, sum or person.
2. Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, yet, by some act,
omission or event which has subsequently taken place, the party has become
entitled to his discharge.
3. Where the process is defective in some substantial form required
by law.
4. Where the process, though in proper form, has been issued in a case
or under circumstances where the law does not allow process or orders for
imprisonment or arrest to issue.
5. Where, although in proper form, the process has been issued or executed by a person either unauthorized to issue or execute the same, or
where the person having the custody of the prisoner under such process is
not the person empowered by law to detain him.
6. Where the process appears to have been obtained by false pretense
or bribery.
7. Where there is no general law, nor any judgment, order or decree of
a court to authorize the process if in a civil suit, nor any conviction if in a
criminal proceeding. No court or judge, on the return of a habeas corpus,
shall, in any other matter, inquire into the legality or justice of a judgment
or decree of a court legally constituted. 1874, March 2, R.S. 1874, p.565,
§ 22.
108. See People ex rel. Lewis v. Frye, 42 Ill. 2d 58, 245 N.E.2d 483, cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969); People ex rel. Haven v. Macieiski, 38 Ill. 2d 396,
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without prejudice to the defendant as to proper filing under the
109
act.
Thus, unlike Mass, where the trial court had in effect treated the
mis-labelled petition as one seeking statutory post-conviction relief,
making refiling unnecessary, the court here felt that no special
burden or prejudice would result due to its affirmance of the dismissal.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, in People ex rel. Palmer
v. Twomey, 1 0 has reappraised their earlier decisions, relied upon
by the Cobb court and concluded that mis-labeled habeas corpus
petitions should in the future be treated as petitions filed pursuant
to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and that counsel be appointed
on request."'
Palmer, following a conviction for two counts of theft, filed pro
se, a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" alleging fatal defects in
his indictment and inadequacy of trial counsel. The petition was
dismissed without appointment of counsel on the grounds that it
was outside the scope of the Habeas Corpus Act. On appeal, the
defendant argued that the court erred in not treating his petition as
one brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and accordingly
appointing counsel per his request.
The supreme court after reviewing their earlier decision in People v. Slaughter,"2 which was the basis for the enactment of Supreme
Court Rule 651 (c) relative to the duties of counsel appointed under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, reversed their prior rulings in
Haven and Lewis:" 3
In our opinion the rationale of Haven and Lewis and the position taken
by the People are not in harmony with the philosophy of People v. Slaughter [citation omitted] . . . . The court [in Slaughter] first observed that
231 N.E.2d 433 (1967); People ex rel. Skinner v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 589, 221

N.E.2d 279 (1966).
109. If the complaints of the defendant should properly have been brought
under a post-conviction petition, he is not precluded from doing so since
the order of the trial court did not adjudicate the merits of his petition.
8 Ill.
App. 3d at 1083, 290 N.E.2d at 612.
110. 53 Ill. 2d 479, 292 N.E.2d 379 (1973).
111. Under the State Habeas Corpus Act, appointment of counsel is not statutorily mandated.
112. 39 Ill. 2d 278, 235 N.E.2d 566 (1968).
113. People ex rel. Haven v. Macieiski, 38 Ill. 2d 396, 231 N.E.2d 433 (1967);
People ex rel. Lewis v. Frye, 42 Ill. 2d 58, 245 N.E.2d 483 (1969).
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the Post-Conviction Hearing Act was intended to eliminate "the Illinois
merry-go-round of writ of error, habeaus corpus and coram nobis" on
which a prisoner had often found himself when collateraly attacking his
114
conviction on constitutional grounds ....

Justice Goldenhersh, speaking for the court, analyzed the rationale of Slaughter as to the responsibilities of counsel appointed

under the Act, and concluded:
It is apparent that the same lack of legal knowledge which causes a
prisoner to draft an inadequate post-conviction petition might result in his
selecting the wrong method of collaterally attacking his conviction. A
salutory result, consistent with the intent of the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act as expressed in Slaughter, would be achieved if the circuit court, upon
finding that a pro se petition, however labeled, and however inartfully
drawn, alleged violations of the petitioner's rights cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding, would thereafter, for all purposes, treat it as such.
This practice would enable the issues to be properly framed and the matter
adjudicated in one proceeding and with finality. We need not and do not
reach the question of whether an indigent petitioner is entitled to appointment of counsel in a habeas corpus action in which no such violations are alleged. 115

The Slaughter principle, with regard to the mis-labeling issue decided in Palmer, was again emphasized in People v. Williams," 6 a
case that highlights the recurrent problems of prisoners who lack
legal services at the institutional level." 7
Williams, following a plea of guilty to deceptive practices, was
sentenced and returned to Georgia to serve a federal sentence. He
later filed the circuit court a pro se document entitled "Motion to
Vacate Judgment and Sentence," alleging numerous violations of his
constitutional rights. No counsel had been appointed. Finding
that the motion was filed after thirty days from entry of judgment,
the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the defendant
claimed that his motion should have been treated as post-conviction
petition and thus counsel should have been appointed.
The court, after noting that the trial court considered the caption

of the motion as determinative without any attempt to construe it as
being within the Act, stated:
The application of the doctrine that pleadings should be liberally con114. 53 Ill. 2d at 483, 292 N.E.2d at 381.
115. Id. at 484, 292 N.E.2d at 382.
116. 11I1l. App. 3d 275, 296N.E.2d 617 (1973).
117. Currently, the states of Ohio, Rhode Island and Texas, recognizing this
dilemma, have instituted free, state-wide legal services for indigent inmates at the
institutional level.
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strued toward the end of accomplishing substantial justice is particularly

crucial in cases where the pleading party is unable to avail himself of the
assistance of counsel. It is axiomatic that the vast majority of inmates of
penal institutions are, by the direct effects of incarceration, rendered unable physically or financially to consult with counsel unless assisted by
the courts. The dangers of exhaltation of form over substance in deter-

mination of such cases are minimized by the normal procedure of appointment of counsel for preparation of an amended post-conviction petition
after a prima facie case has been alleged. 11 8

Thus, while the standards for post-conviction petitions set out
in section 122-2 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act will be insisted upon by the courts, the spirit of Slaughter has resulted in the
Palmer and Williams decisions relating to poorly drafted petitions
seeking to collaterally attack a conviction."' In the future, if the
allegations of the submitted pro se document are fairly within the
scope of the Act it must be treated as such and counsel must be appointed on request.
POST-CONVICTION

HEARING ACT--SCOPE

As indicated above, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is limited
in scope to an adjudication of claims of substantial deprivation
of state or federal constitutional rights of a convicted felon in the proceeding which resulted in his penitentiary incarceration.
In People v. Dale," ° decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in
1950, it was held that the act did not constitutionally discriminate
against misdemeanants serving jail sentences due simply to the fact
that it is jurisdictionally restricted to use by those imprisoned in the
penitentiary. Until June of this year, misdemeanants had only direct
appeal, and the very limited vehicles of section 72 of the Civil
Practice Act' 2 ' and the state Habeas Corpus Act 122 with which to
challenge the constitutionality of the proceedings resulting in their
incarceration. Late this survey year however, the Illinois Supreme
Court, in two companion cases, People v. Davis"' and People v.
118. 11111. App. 3d at 277, 296 N.E.2d at 617-18.
119. See also People v. Cook, 11 111. App. 3d 216, 296 N.E.2d 612 (1973) (error
to dismiss a pro se post-conviction petition, after evidentiary hearing where additional
issues were litigated, due to failure of the petition to specify that issue).
120. 406 Ill. 238, 92 N.E.2d 761 (1950).
121. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1971).
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 65, §§ 22-1 et seq. (1971).
123. 54 Ill. 2d 494, 298 N.E.2d 161 (1973).
The decision here was rendered
pursuant to the Warr case.
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Warr,' reversed Dale and fashioned under their supervisory powers, a remedy in the nature of a post-conviction relief for misdemeanants.

In both Davis and Warr, the latter case consolidating three similar appeals,"' all of the petitioners, who were serving terms of one
year or less, sought post-conviction relief by alleging constitutional
deprivations in their respective trial level proceedings. The petitioners sought to utilize either the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the
state Habeas Corpus Act, or a combination of the two, to raise
their claims. In each case the petitions were dismissed, among
other reasons, on the basis that the non-felony convictions were
without the jurisdictional scope of the remedies relied upon.
The court in Warr, the germinal decision, in the course of surveying available post-trial vehicles, noted that section 72 of the Civil
Practice Act is very limited in scope and would automatically exclude clauses of denial of counsel, plus most other allegations of
constitutional proportions commonly raised by convicts seeking
post-trial relief.' 26 In addition, the Habeas Corpus Act only provides relief on the grounds set out in the statute. Finally, it was
noted that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applied only to persons "imprisoned in the penitentiary."' 27 Thus the problem, as
stated by Justice Schaefer, "is the determination of the remedy to
be pursued by a person convicted of a misdemeanor who asserts that
his constitutional rights were violated in the proceeding which re28
sulted in his conviction."1
People v. Dale"9 was reversed on the basis of the growing number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions which have rejected under the
fourteenth amendment, in large part, remedial distinctions based
upon the length of the sentence imposed.13 0 Accordingly the court
124. 54 Ill. 2d 487, 298 N.E.2d 164 (1973).
125. People ex rel. Johnson v. Sheriff (No. 45183); People v. Finch (No.
44493); People ex rel. Finch v. English (No. 44212).
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1971).
127. ILL. REV. STAT. oh. 38, § 122 (1971).
128. 54 IIl. 2d at 493, 298 N.E.2d at 167.

129. 406 Ill. 238, 92 N.E.2d 761 (1950).
130. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Mayer v. City of
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971); Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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in Warr, realizing, first, the inadequacy of available post trial procedures in alleged instances of constitutional violations and, second,
the non-applicability of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act to misdemeanants, utilized their supervisory authority to fashion a remedy.' 3 '
Utilizing the Act as a basic model, the court held:
[U]ntil otherwise provided by rule of this court or by statute a defendant
convicted of a misdemeanor who asserts that in the proceedings which
resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his constitutional rights may institute a proceeding in the nature of a proceeding
32
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.'

The remedy provided, the court continued, would be governed by
the act in all regards, with the following modifications:
(1)
(2)

(3)

The defendant need not be imprisoned;
The proceeding shall be commenced within 4 months after rendition
of final judgment if judgment was entered upon a plea of guilty
and within six months after the rendition of final judgment following
33
a trial upon a plea of not guilty;'
Counsel need not be appointed to represent an indigent defendant if
the trial judge, after examination of the petition, enters an order
finding that the record in the case, read in conjunction with the defendant's petition and the responsive pleading of. the prosecution, if
4
any, conclusively shows that the defendant is entitled to no relief."3

As indicated above, the statutory scope of the Act is jurisdictional. In addition, it does not apply to alleged constitutional violations raised by a prisoner that are unrelated to the original proceedings. 3 5 In a series of recent decisions, the Illinois courts have
further delineated which allegations, on their face, are not cognizable under the Act as raising substantial constitutional issues.
In People v. Wisdom' and People v. Cox, 3 7 it was held that
the failure of the trial court to advise a defendant of his right to ap131. Differences in criminal procedure before, during and after trial may
be based on differences in the gravity of the offense and the severity of
its punishment [citations omitted], but those differences cannot justify the
total denial of a remedy for violations of constitutional rights.
People v. Warr, 54 11. 2d 489, 492, 298 N.E.2d 164, 166-67 (1973).
132. Id. at 493, 298 N.E.2d at 167.
133. The present statute of limitations is twenty years. See ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 122-1 (1971).
134. 54 Ill. 2d at 492, 298 N.E.2d at 166-67. See discussion regarding the
appointment of counsel under the act proper, infra.
135. People v. Woods, 10 11. App. 3d 6, 293 N.E.2d 633 (1973).
136. 6 Ill. App. 3d 840, 286 N.E.2d 749 (1972).
137. 53 Ill. 2d 101, 291 N.E.2d 1 (1972).
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peal did not amount to a constitutional deprivation cognizable in
a post-conviction proceeding initiated under the Act. While Supreme Court Rule 605,18 adopted in 1967, requires that all defendants convicted of a felony be advised of their right to appeal,
noncompliance does not raise an issue within the scope of the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act.

In Cox, brought to judgment prior to the enactment of Rule 605,
Justice Goldenhersh, speaking for the Illinois Supreme Court ruled:
Our rule [605] stems from the dictates of good practice rather than constitutional command, and where the question has arisen, it has been
held that the failure of a court to advise of the right to appeal is not a
denial of due process or equal protection. .

.

.

Clearly, the failure to

advise petitioner of his right to appeal from a judgment of conviction entered prior to the adoption of the rule raises no question of constitu39
tional dimension.1

In a similar fashion, the courts have reaffirmed the position that
the violation of most statutes and Supreme Court Rules by the state
or trial court does not amount to constitutional stature for pur-

poses of a post-conviction proceeding under the Act.
In People v. Majeski,140 it was held that even though the holding

of the defendant for a forty day period prior to his appearance before a magistrate may have violated the statute requiring presentment without unnecessary delay,"' the alleged violation was not a

sufficient basis for post-conviction relief.
This position found clear support in People v. Gardner,'41 where

the petitioner alleged that the trial court's failure to advise him of
his right to indictment by a grand jury prior to the acceptance of a
plea of guilty amounted to a substantial constitutional deprivation.

In affirming the dismissal of the defendant's post-conviction

petition after a hearing, the court stated:
Whereas the Court should have inquired as to defendant's comprehension
of his rights, failure to do so does not automatically raise a constitutional
objection in accepting the guilty plea. It must be remembered that this is
an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief after a hearing, and the
Illinois Supreme Court has held that only those allegations that assert a
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 605 (1971).
139. 53 Ill. 2d at 106, 291 N.E.2d at 4.
140. 7 Ill. App. 3d 624, 287 N.E.2d 725 (1972).
141. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 103-5 and 109-1 (1971).
142. 8 Ill. App. 3d 588, 289 N.E.2d 638 (1972).
138.
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denial of constitutional rights will justify such an action [citation omitted]. The violation of a right granted by statute or Supreme Court Rule
here unless such a right involves a
is not a matter that will justify relief
143
constitutional (State or Federal) right.

In a different statutory context, the Fifth District Appellate Court,

in the case of People v. Crutcher,14 has ruled that the allegation of
a violation of the 120 day rule also does not raise an issue of constitutional dimension for purposes of the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act.
Errors in sentencing 45 or the failure to hold a statutorily mandated hearing in aggravation and mitigation prior to sentencing
where requested, 46 likewise do not raise issues of constitutional
magnitude. As stated by Justice Ryan of the Supreme Court in
People v. Brouhard:
This court has held that the provisions of section 1-7(g) of the Criminal
Code . . . requiring a hearing in aggravation and mitigation do not stem

from a constitutional command nor confer constitutional rights [citations
to be considered under
omitted]. This contention is therefore not proper
147
the provisions of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.

In People v. Forston14 1 and People v. Ballinger,149 the supreme court
held that where the imposition of a sentence is within the statutory
limits, claims of excessiveness are outside the scope of the Act.
Finally, in People v. Christeson, 50 the obvious but often misunderstood point was made that a proceeding under the Act is not
for the redetermination of guilt or innocence, and thus contentions
as to the sufficiency of the evidence are not of constitutional magnitude.
143. Id. at 590, 289 N.E.2d at 640. See also People v. Ballinger, 53 Il1. 2d 388,
292 N.E.2d 400 (1973) (alleged violations of statutory provisions rendering an indictment invalid did not raise constitutional issues cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act).
144. 8 Ill. App. 3d 772, 290 N.E.2d 417 (1971).
145. People v. Carter, 9 Ill. App. 3d 80, 291 N.E.2d 266 (1972).
146. People v. Brouhard, 53 111. 2d 109, 290 N.E.2d 206 (1972). See also
People v. Blewitt, 11 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 298 N.E.2d 366 (1973).
147. 53 Ill. 2d at 113, 290 N.E.2d at 208-09. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7
(g)(1971).
148. 8 fI1. App. 3d 613, 291 N.E.2d 45 (1972).
149. 53 Ill. 2d 388, 292 N.E.2d 400 (1973).
150. 10 Ill. App. 3d 214, 293 N.E.2d 138 (1973).
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Another aspect of the scope of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
that of the necessity of incarceration as a prerequisite to relief, has
been discussed in two recent decisions. The Illinois Supreme Court
in People ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey'
involving a petitioner released from prison during the pendency of his post-conviction action, and the Fifth District Appellate Court in People v. Bain,'5 2 involving a parolee, have established that, unlike the Habeas Corpus
Act, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not require a lessening of the length of incarceration as a sine qua non for relief."5 3
A final, peripheral point regarding the factor of incarceration,
is that of the statute of limitations. In People v. Wallace,' the
petitioner, a California prisoner, sought to attack a 1959 Illinois
conviction on which he had served a two year sentence. The
court, while noting that as of 1965 the statute of limitations for
seeking post-conviction relief under the Act was extended to twenty
years,' 5 held that the five year statute in effect at the date of the petitioner's conviction governed the disposition of the instant case.
Thus, the 1965 amendment does not revive any rights to post-conviction relief that have expired prior to the effective date of the
amendment.
POST CONVICTION HEARING ACT-RES JUDICATA AND WAIVER

In addition to the handicap of a number of basic issues not being
within the scope of the Act per se, petitioners face the additional
problem of having an issue or issues, arguably within the scope of
the Act, lost due to the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. The
Illinois courts have continued to hold that where a defendant has
taken a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction on a com151.
152.

53 Ill. 2d 479, 292 N.E.2d 379 (1973).
10 Ill. App. 3d 363, 293 N.E.2d 758 (1973).

153. It was stated on oral argument that petitioner had been discharged
and is no longer incarcerated, and it may be that he no longer desires to
seek post-conviction relief. The judgment of dismissal of this cause is not

res judicata and the fact that his term of imprisonment has ended does
not of itself serve to bar the institution of post-conviction proceedings.
53 Ill. 2d at 484, 292 N.E.2d at 382. See also People v. Davis, 39 Ill. 2d 325,
235 N.E.2d 634 (1968).
154. 8 Ill. App. 3d 587, 290 N.E.2d 6 (1972).
155. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (1965).
156. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 826 (1959).
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plete record, the judgment of the reviewing court is res judicata as

to all issues actually decided, and that all issues which could have
been presented but were not are waived. 1 7 The same applies
even though the issues that were raised have not yet been decided
by the reviewing court. As stated in People v. Walker:
The scope of review permitted in a post-conviction proceeding is not
expanded simply because the petition is filed before a reviewing court
hands down an opinion. Once an issue is presented on direct appeal to
a court of review, it cannot properly be considered at a post-conviction
hearing even though at the time of the hearing the reviewing court has
not passed on the question.1 58

Thus, unless the trial court or a court reviewing the dismissal
of a post-conviction petition rules that fundamental fairness requires a review of the issue regardless of waiver or res judicata, 15 0
the issues are lost. A further discussion of this topic will be pur-

sued in the following analysis of recent decisions dealing with the
adequacy of appointed post-conviction counsel.
POST-CONVICTION HEARING ACT-ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL

The responsibilities of counsel appointed to represent an indigent inmate in a proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act are delineated in Supreme Court Rule 651(c), 160 which was a
direct result of the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in People
v. Slaughter. 6' Section 122-4 of the Code of Criminal Proce157. See People v. Mitchell, 11 111.App. 3d 40, 295 N.E.2d 517 (1973); People
v. Doyle, 10 Ill. App. 3d 145, 294 N.E.2d 16 (1973); People v. Moore, 9 Ill. App.
3d 896, 293 N.E.2d 367 (1973); People v. Gonzales, 9 Ill. App. 3d 661, 292 N.E.2d
765 (1973); People v. Danner, 9 Ill. App. 3d 233, 292 N.E.2d 114 (1972); People
v. Lyons, 8 Ill. App. 3d 825, 291 N.E.2d 353 (1972); People v. Stasin, 8 Ill. App. 3d
535, 290 N.E.2d 15 (1972); People v. Walker, 6 Ill. App. 3d 909, 286 N.E.2d 812
(1972); People v. Jones, 5 Ill. App. 3d 951, 284 N.E.2d 418 (1972); People v.
Nettles, 5 IlI.
App. 3d 1056, 284 N.E.2d 502 (1972).
158. 6 II1. App. 3d 909, 911, 286 N.E.2d 812, 815 (1972). The problems in
this regard for appointed post-conviction counsel are exacerbated due to the fact
that quite often the other counsel has filed a direct appeal prior to his entry in the
case.
159. See People v. Ikerd, 47 Ill. 2d 211, 265 N.E.2d 120 (1970).
160. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 651(c) (1971).
161. 39 Ill. 2d 278, 285, 235 N.E.2d 566, 569 (1968):
To the end that the complaints of a prisoner with respect to the validity of
his conviction might be adequately presented, the statute [re appointment
of counsel] contemplated that the attorney appointed to represent an indigent petitioner would consult with him either by mail or in person, ascer-
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dure of 1963162 provides that in proceedings for post-conviction relief under the Act, counsel shall be appointed on request to assist
indigent prisoners. Supreme Court Rule 651(c) provides:
The record filed in that [appellate] court shall contain a showing, which
may be made by the certificate of the petitioner's attorney, that the attorney has consulted with petitioner either by mail or in person to ascertain his contentions of deprivation of constitutional right, has examined the
record of the proceedings at the trial, and has made any amendments to
the petition filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation
163
of petitioner's contentions.

Claims of inadequate post-conviction representation raised by
unsuccessful petitioners continue to be routinely dismissed where
the record or the certificate of appointed counsel indicate compliance with the mandate of Rule 651(c).164 In several recent decisions, the courts have amplified certain aspects of the wording of
Rule 651 (c) in the course of dismissing claims of the inadequacy of

counsel.
With regard to the required contacts with the petitioner, the
submission of a questionnaire 1 5 or a series of letters,' 6 6 even when
the defendant fails to respond,' 16 7 personal contacts by the law
partner of the attorney actually appointed, 168 and a personal visit
required by a court order, 6 9 have all been upheld as complying

with that aspect of Rule 651 (c).
As to the failure to amend the petitioners' original pro se petition,
which is one of the most often raised complaints by petitioners, the
tain his alleged grievances, examine the record of the proceedings at the
trial and then amend the petition that had been filed pro se, so that it
would adequately present the prisoner's constitutional contentions.
162. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-4 (1963).
163. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. llOA, § 651(c) (1971). This parallels that required
of appointed appellate counsel prior to the granting of a motion to withdraw as
counsel. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 22-3 (1969) provides that counsel must state
that the record has been reviewed, that no substantial arguments exist and that an
appeal would be frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
164. See People v. Gaston, 9 Ill. App. 3d 623, 292 N.E.2d 478 (1973); People v.
Crutcher, 8 Ill. App. 3d 772, 290 N.E.2d 417 (1972); People v. Johnson, 7 Ill.
App. 3d 92, 287 N.E.2d 65 (1972).
165. People v. Anthony, 5 II. App. 3d 722, 284 N.E.2d 46 (1972).
166. People v. Snodgrass, 7 Il1. App. 3d 310, 287 N.E.2d 477 (1972); People v.
Roebuck, 7 Ill. App. 3d 7, 286 N.E.2d 149 (1972).
167. People v. Sullivan, 6 Ill. App. 3d 814, 286 N.E.2d 605 (1972).
168. People v. Westbrook, 5 Ill. App. 3d 970, 284 N.E.2d 695 (1972).
169. People v. Andriesse, 7 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 288 N.E.2d 917 (1972).
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courts have continued to hold that such a failure is not a violation of
the requirements of Rule 651(c) per se. 17 ° As stated by the supreme court in their earlier decision in People v. Stovall:
Where there is not a showing that sufficient facts or evidence exist, inadequate representation certainly will not be found because of an attorney's
failure to amend a petition or, when amended, failing to make the petition's allegations factually sufficient to require the granting of relief.' 7 1

The Stovall ruling has been followed with regularity where no
amendment was in fact made by appointed counsel. 17 2 It has
also been recently determined that amendment, over the objections
1 73
of the petitioner, meets the Rule 65 1(c) standards.
Recent decisions holding that post-conviction petitioners were
not provided with adequate representation due to noncompliance
with either the letter or the spirit of Rule 651(c), while not numerous, merit extended discussion as a means of shedding further light
on the scope and intent of the supreme court's germinal decision
in Slaughter.
Where no certificate has been filed by counsel and the record itself does not make a clear showing of compliance, the courts will
reverse the dismissal of a post-conviction petition, even though the
issues raised therein would either be res judicata or waived due to a
prior direct appeal. A prime example in this regard is People v.
Brittain,'7 4 recently decided by the Illinois Supreme Court. Relative
to the petitioner's allegation of inadequate representation, the court,
speaking through Justice Goldenhersh, stated:
Every pleading filed on petitioner's behalf was obviously prepared without assistance of counsel, and although the transcripts of the proceedings
in the circuit court in each instance note the presence of assistant public
defenders, they contain not one word purportedly uttered by any of them.
There is nothing to indicate that counsel, at any stage of the case in the
170. Note that the language of Rule 651(c) in this regard states that only
"necessary" amendments need be made, a change from the literal reading of the
relevant portion of the Slaughter decision, supra note 158.
171. 47 Ill.
2d 42, 46, 264 N.E.2d 174, 176 (1970).
172. See People v. Wollenberg, 9 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 293 N.E.2d 728 (1973);
People v. Riggs, 8 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 291 N.E.2d 246 (1972); People v. Fuller, 7
Ill. App. 3d 931, 289 N.E.2d 105 (1972); People v. Spencer, 7 Inl. App. 3d 827,
288 N.E.2d 682 (1972); People v. Weaver, 6 111. App. 3d 286, 285 N.E.2d 547
(1972); People v. Anthony, 5 Ill. App. 3d 722, 284 N.E.2d 46 (1972).
173. People v. Redmond, 10 1. App. 3d 55, 294 N.E.2d 5 (1972) (twelve page
pro se petition reduced to one and one-half pages).
174. 52 Ill. 2d 91, 284 N.E.2d 632 (1972).
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circuit court, sought to ascertain the basis of petitioner's complaints, and
the pro se petitions were not amended so as to state his contentions in
legal form. Clearly, petitioner did not receive the effective assistance of
175
counsel which we have held essential ....

The case was reversed and remanded with an additional order
to appoint counsel other than the public defender, inasmuch as
part of the defendant's allegations were that the public defender
76
had improperly induced a plea of guilty at the trial level.'

As noted above, the requirement of a showing of compliance
with Rule 651(c) is fully applicable even in instances where the issues raised in the pro se petition would be res judicata or waived
due to the finalization or pendancy of a prior direct appeal. As recently held by the Illinois Supreme Court, in certain instances fundamental fairness militates against the formalization of the twin appellate doctrines as it relates to the spirit of Slaughter and Rule
651(c).
In People v. Brown,' 7 no ceritificate of compliance had been
filed by the appointed counsel and the record failed to indicate such

compliance. The petitioner appealed the dismissal of his petition on
the basis of inadequate representation. In response to the State's
argument that reversal of the dismissal was not warranted since
all of the issues raised in it were either res judicata or waived due
to an earlier direct appeal,17 Justice Ward, speaking for the court,
stated:
It is, of course, generally correct that claims which were or could have
been presented on direct appeal may not later be raised in a petition for
post-conviction relief [citations omitted]. But the State's assumption that
all trial errors would be res judicata or waived is gratuitous. To illustrate, this court, if fundamental fairness requires, may not permit the doctrine of waiver to be invoked in post-conviction proceedings on appeal
[citations omitted]. Too, the purpose underlying Rule 651(c) is not
175. Id. at 93-94, 284 N.E.2d at 633. See also People v. Durley, 53 Ill. 2d 156,
290 N.E.2d 244 (1972); People v. Lampson, 8 111. App. 3d 544, 289 N.E.2d 651
(1972); People v. Rooney, 6 111. App. 3d 527, 285 N.E.2d 586 (1972).
176. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-3 (1971) where provision is made for
reappointment of counsel other than the public defender is made, for good cause
shown.
177. 52 Il. 2d 227, 287 N.E.2d 663 (1972).
178. The state first argued that while there was no indication that counsel had
examined the record, there was no evidence that he had not done so. This argument was summarily rejected since Rule 651(c) explicitly requires a showing that
counsel has examined the trial proceedings.
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merely formal. It is to ensure that all indigents are provided proper repsentation when presenting claims of constitutional deprivation under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act [citations omitted]. The fulfillment of this
to ignore the rule's nonobservdesign would not be encouraged were we
179
ance in those cases appealed to this court.

Similarly, in the case of People ex rel. Walke'r v. Twomey,' s0

the Second District Apellate Court allowed, on the basis of fundamental fairness, the filing of a second post-conviction petition alleging incompetency of trial counsel, even though that issue was raised
in a pending direct appeal, after the dismissal of an original postconviction petition.

Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, setting forth among other points, the incompetency issue. It
was dismissed on the basis that such claims were not within the
scope of the Habeas Corpus Act.""
The court affirmed the habeas corpus dismissal, stating:
The remedy of habeas corpus is not available to review errors which only
render the judgment voidable and are of a nonjurisdictional nature even
though a claim of denial of constitutional right is involved [citations
omitted]. A claim of the denial of the constitutional right to counsel
cannot be determined on a writ of habeas corpus [citations omitted]. The
failure of a circuit court to process and take action upon a post-conviction
petition has also been held not to be a subsequent act, omission or event
proper remreferred to in section 22, with the result that the petitioner's
82
edy would be mandamus rather than habeas corpus.I

However, the court continued, due to the fact that (1) the attor-

ney appointed to represent defendant on his original post-conviction petition

83

was the one alleged to have been incompetent at

trial, and (2) the proscriptions of Supreme Court Rule 651(c) on
2d at 230, 287 N.E.2d at 665.
179. 52 IMI.
180. 9 I11. App. 3d 544, 291 N.E.2d 833 (1973).
181. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 65, §§ 1 etseq., and § 22(2) (1971).
182. 9 Il. App. 3d at 546, 291 N.E.2d at 835. As to the jurisdictional nature
of the state remedy of habeas corpus, see People v. Landis, 12 Ill. App. 3d 608,
299 N.E.2d 28 (1973) (excessive sentence); People v. Smith, 12 Ill. App. 3d 9,
297 N.E.2d 29 (1973) (extradition); People ex rel. Morgan v. Twomey, 9 Il1.
App. 3d 1006, 293 N.E.2d 683 (1973); People ex rel. Lonberger v. Elrod, 9 Ill.
App. 3d 921, 293 N.E.2d 432 (1973); People v. Cobb, 8 MI1.App. 3d 1081, 290
N.E.2d 610 (1972); People ex rel. Brown v. Brantley, 7 111. App. 3d 558, 288
N.E.2d 92 (1972).
183. The trial court on the hearing relative to the first petition ignored appointed counsel's statement that he had not read nor was familiar with the record,
and dismissed the petition. Counsel did not appeal the decision or inform the petitioner of its dismissal.
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the first petition were not met, the defendant was allowed to proceed with a second post-conviction petition:
While, in our view, none of the arguments which petitioner has raised
would entitle him to relief in the nature of habeas corpus, it is also

clear from the record that fundamental fairness requires that he be permitted to effectively present in a judicial proceeding his constitutional
claim of incompetent trial counsel. Although a direct appeal of petitioner's claim is now pending in the Illinois Supreme Court and incompetence
of counsel is alleged there, review of the incompetency issue will be lim-

ited to the record before the Supreme Court.'

84

In a final decision to be mentioned relative to the inadequacy of
counsel appointed under the terms of the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act, noncompliance with Rule 651 (c) was found even though counsel
had filed a certificate of compliance with the court. In People v.
Luechtefeld, 1 85 an examination of the record showed that at the time
that the certificate was filed, the trial proceedings, probation hearing
and probation revocation hearing had not been transcribed, obviously
establishing noncompliance with Rule 651(c). Accordingly, the
dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for purposes of transcription and appointment of counsel.
PRISONER RIGHTS

The final general topic to be discussed in this survey of recent
developments in the post-conviction area will be certain aspects of
the constitutional rights of inmates incarcerated in Illinois penitentiaries. The ensuing discussion will revolve, in the main, around
three recent decisions by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 18 6
While, not decisions rendered by Illinois courts, the broad nature of
the holdings and their effect on Illinois' prisoners and prison officials, require extended attention, in the author's view, in any analy184.

9 Il. App. 3d at 546-47, 291 N.E.2d at 835.

The claimed necessity for an

evidentiary hearing was that facts not in the record were necessary to establish
petitioner's claim.
185. 11 111. App. 3d 407, 408, 296 N.E.2d 771, 772 (1973): "Compliance with
Supreme Court Rule 651(c) necessarily requires access to the transcript of the
several proceedings if such can be prepared."

App. 3d 850, 289 N.E.2d 106 (1972)

See also People v. Russell, 7 Il1.

(petitioner was entitled, in a post-conviction

proceeding, to a transcript of the separate trial of a co-defendant).
186. Adams v. Carlson, No. 73-1268 (7th Cir., Aug. 23, 1973); United States
ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973); Morales v. Schmidt,
No. 72-1373 (7th Cir., Jan. 17, 1973).
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sis of recent post-conviction developments relevant to members of
the Illinois bar.
To summarize broadly, the cases raise the following basic issues: the appropriate constitutional test by which to gauge the
propriety of institutional restrictions on a prisoner's correspondence rights; the requirements of due process prior to the revocation
of an inmate's statutorily earned "good time" credit; the retroactive
application of such procedures to prison rules infraction hearings;
the scope of the State's responsibility to protect inmates from violent
attack by other inmates; the restrictions on the right of access to
court and counsel; and finally, the use of segregated confinement
as a constitutional mode of punishment for internal rules violations.
Morales v. Schmidt'8 7 arose out of the entry of a preliminary
injunction by the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin 1 88 enjoining Wisconsin corrections officials from restricting correspondence between Juan Morales and his sister-in-law. In a letter
to her, Morales noted that he was the father of a child by her and
that he hoped to continue their relationship upon his release. The
letter was intercepted by officials at the Wisconsin State Prison of
Waupun and read. x8 9 Pursuant to regulatory discretion, she was
placed on Morales' restricted correspondence list, 9 0 on the basis
it would be inappropriate to allow continuance of correspondence
especially
with one whom the inmate had had an illicit relationship,
9'
it.'
continue
to
intention
an
since the letter indicated
187. No. 72-1373 (7th Cir., Jan. 17, 1973).
188. 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972). Though Morales was on parole at
the time of appeal, the court did not consider that sufficient to render the issues
moot, due to the controls exercised over parolees and the possibility of Morales' return to prison in the event of a violation of parole conditions.
189. In Illinois, incoming as well as outgoing mail may be read as well as inspected for contraband. See ILL. DEPT. CORRECTIONs Reg. No. 823 (1-2) (1970).
The reading of inmate mail is a common practice in U.S. prisons and is normally
justified on the basis of the "security" of the institution.
190. "[Alt the discretion of the warden, superintendent, or designated official,
the delivery or dispatch of any inmate correspondence . . . may be withheld for
reasons of propriety, security or the welfare of the institution or inmate. .. ."
Regulations, DlVISION OF CORRECTIONS, State of Wisconsin (1971). This regulation was passed pursuant to section 53.09 of the Wisconsin statutes which prohibits
communications between any prisoner and outside person except as provided by
prison regulation.
191. This regulation and the accompanying action is far from exceptional and is
a common feature of an overall official attitude toward inmate responsibility in
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The trial court centered its ruling on several bases: the freedom

to use the mails is a first amendment right; a non-convicted person
would have been free to send the correspondence at issue; that

when the state acts to deny this freedom to a member of the class of
persons who have been convicted of crime, the state has the burden
of showing a compelling state interest in doing so; and lastly, that
the state's interest in internal discipline and Morales' rehabilitation failed to meet that test.

Judge Pell, speaking for the majority on appeal, noted the continual difficulty faced by the courts in trying to assess what constitu-

tional rights are possessed by those incarcerated in American jails
and penitentiaries and the extent of such rights."9 2

The dilemma

has increased, the court continued, as more cases are brought which
seek the further delineation of the basic issues. 193

As to the pre-

cise issue raised by Morales-the violation of his rights under
vogue among state and federal correctional officials. See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS, POLICY STATEMENT No. 7300.1A(5b) (March 16, 1972), where the guidelines for correspondence restrictions state:
The guiding consideration or criteria for all correspondence should be:
(1) is the correspondent genuinely interested in the inmate or just a chance
acquaintance; or (2) does the correspondent seek to continue a genuine
friendship or is the correspondence likely to result in some future relationship detrimental to the inmate or to the correspondent?
See also ILL. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONs, Reg. No. 823(l)(I.A.) (1973), which
provides:
Inmates may receive an unlimited number of letters from anyone, except
where the Chief Administrative Officer believes that certain correspondence
would represent a threat to the safety, security, or morale of the institution.
It should be noted that under any of the above regulations, there are no definitional standards by which to make the necessary determinations regarding restrictions on an inmate's mail privileges.
192. See, e.g., THE EMERGINNG RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED (Correctional Development Foundation, S.C. 1972); Hirschkop and Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of
Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795 (1969); Hollen, Emerging Prisoner Rights, 33
OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1972); Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmates Rights, 5 HAxv. Civ.
RIGHTs-Crv. LaB. L. REv. 227 (1970); Symposium, Prisoners' Rights and the Correctional System: The Legal Controversy and Problems of Implementation, 16 VILL.
L. REV. 1029 (1971); Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for
PrisonerRights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REv. 473 (1971).
193. Since the gradual erosion in the past eight years of the "hands-off" doctrine, through which courts deferred to administrative discretion on most matters,
the federal courts, via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the federal Habeas Corpus Act, have
been literally inundated with claims of prisoners challenging the constitutionality of
the conditions of their confinement. See generally Comment, Beyond the Ken of the
Courts: A Critique of ludicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72
YALE L. J. 506 (1963).
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the first, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments-earlier decisions
dealing with various aspects of an inmate's correspondence rights
were deemed of minimal assistance, inasmuch as they dealt in the
main with legal or quasi-governmental communications or with
factual settings too far removed from those involved in the instant
case.'1 4 The vital issue, as contended by the State, was the district court's adoption of the "compelling state interest" test as the
proper conceptual vehicle by which to judge the validity of prison
regulations affecting the constitutional rights of inmates.
The State argued that few, if any, prison regulations, vitally
necessary for the functional operation of an institution, could withstand attack under such test. The court noted that the test was
only one of several used to determine the constitutional propriety of
governmental curbs on a citizen's liberty and further noted the inherent imprecision of any such concept. In responding to the fears
set forth by the State, the court rejected the invitation to rule that
certain conditions were inherent in institutional life, 95 but enunciated their view of the hazards involved in any pell-mell approach
towards determining the scope of a prisoners constitutional rights:
In our opinion, courts have been widely hesitant about involving themselves too deeply in the day-to-day operations of a state penal system.

Prison administrators necessarily must have freedom to exercise discretion
in the execution of their duties. 196

As to the district court's determination of the applicability of the
equal protection clause and the "compelling state interest" test to
the two classes of prisoner and non-prisoner, the court, refining its
194. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Warden, 465 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1972) (mail between inmates); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971) (access to
media); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1049 (1972) (access to court and counsel); Sellers v. Beto, 345 F. Supp. 499

(S.D. Texas 1972) (restriction of privileges due to alleged retaliation); Smith v.
Robbins, 328 F. Supp. 162 (D. Me. 1971) (access to court and counsel); Polmigiano
v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D. R.I. 1970) (censorship of mail).

195. Although some courts have referred to conditions "inherent" in a system of punishment, we think such an inquiry is unwise. It would plunge
us into a philosophical debate far removed from our proper judicial function
of interpreting and applying the Constitution. Further, a decision based on
our understanding of "punishment" would merely reflect our personal predilection for certain social and moral policies, e.g., retribution or utilitarianism.

Morales v. Schmidt, No. 72-1373 at 11.
196. Id. at 11-12.
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above position, stated:
We disagree that the equal protection clause mandates the elimination of
the distinction between the two classes here. The Supreme Court has indicated that the constitutional limitations on governmental actions differ
depending on the role in which the government is acting in a particular
case. This is so despite the fact that each situation might involve the
97
same constitutional interest of the affected individuals.1

Accordingly, the court continued, the constitution does not require that a state show a compelling governmental interest when it
seeks to restricts an inmate or parolee's associations or written communications with persons who are not their counsel or governmental
officials:
The appropriate standard by which to judge the constitutionality of the
kind of restriction the defendant wishes to impose in this case is the usual
one for analyzing State action, namely, whether the action contemplated
bears a rational relationship to or is reasonably necessary for the ad98
vancement of a justifiable purpose of the State.'

The court indicated that regardless of their ruling, prison administrators were not free to determine on their own what rights were or
were not possessed by prisoners under their charge and that a cursory review of future prisoner's claims should not be expected by the
State.
Pursuant to their ruling, the order of the district court was
reversed, and due to the insufficiency of the record, the case was
remanded to determine if the State's proposed correspondence regulations were justified under the rational relationship standard.' 99
The second case, Miller v. Twomey,200 was actually the consoli-

dation of six separate actions, 2 ' four by Illinois prisoners and two
197. Id. at 10.
198. Id. at 12.
199. In the course of its opinion the court did note the fact that several federal
courts, in keeping with the decision of the district court, have applied the "compelling state interest" test to a wide range of restraints placed upon the rights of
inmates. See, e.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Jackson
v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp.
776 (D.R.I. 1970); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
But see Wilson v. Prasee, 463 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972); Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d
966 (8th Cir. 1969); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967); Seale v.
Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971).
200. 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973).
201. United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey; Green v. Bensinger; Thomas v.
Bensinger; Krause v. Schmidt; Armstrong v. Bensinger; Gutierrez v. Department of
Public Safety. The court initially cited the recent decision of the United States
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by Wisconsin inmates. All were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 alleging a violation of federally protected rights by the respective State prison officials. In Miller, Green and Thomas, the plaintiffs pro se complaints alleging the unconstitutional deprivation
of "good time credits" were dismissed without a hearing. In
Krause, the trial court held that due process must be afforded inmates before the state officials may punish them by way of segregation or loss of "good time" credits. In Armstrong, a group of
inmates challenged the procedures by which they were placed in a
newly created "Special Program Unit" at Joliet Penitentiary for
especially disruptive prisoners. Finally, in Gutierrez, the plaintiff
appealed from a dismissal of his negligence action against the warden arising out of a beating he received at the hands of another inmate. These groupings of cases will be discussed in the above order.
The law of the State of Illinois, under prior law 20 2 and the new
Unified Code of Corrections, 20 3 provides that the Department of
Corrections shall establish a regulatory scheme for diminution of sentence on the basis of an inmate's good behavior. In return for such
behavior, a certain amount of "good time" is alloted the prisoner
each month. It serves both to reduce the length of his maximum
sentence 20 4 as well as his minimum term for purposes of his first
Supreme Court in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) which held that prisoners seeking restoration of good time credit must proceed by way of habeas corpus rather than by § 1983. However, they noted that the defendants did not
raise that objection to the court's jurisdiction, and thus proceeded.
202. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108, §§ 45, 47 (1963).
203. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3 (Supp. 1972).
204. The present good time schedule is set out in ILL. DEPT. CoRRErTONS,
REG.No.813 (1-2) (1970):

Sentence
1st year
2nd "
3rd "

4th"
5th"
6th
7th
8th
9th

"

10th

"

llth
12th
13th

"
"

Time to be Served
11 months
1 year & 9 months
2

6

2
9
3
9

"
"
"

3
9

5

5

"

"

3 "
3 "
4 "
4 "
6
6
7
7

"
"
"

3
9
3
9
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In addition to

the basic good time schedule,20 6 several other department regulations provide for the accumulation of "good time" credits.20 7
The current statute, 20

as under prior law, 20 9 requires the estab-

lishment of department procedures for the revocation of accumulated
good time credit based upon a subsequent institutional rules viola-

tion. The basic institutional rules of conduct are set out in Regulation 805.210 These, in effect are the "laws" of the prison community,
14th
15th
16th
17th
18th
19th
20th
21st
22nd
23rd
24th
25th

"
"
"
"
"

"
"
"
"
"
"
"

8 "
3
8 "
9
9 "
3
9 "
9
10 "
3
10 "
9
11 "
3
11 "
9
12 "
3
12 "
9
13 "
3
13 "
9
1003-3-3(a)(1) (Supp.1972).
Reg. No. 814 (1973), which provides for
90 days from the time an inmate must
to see the Parole Board after an initial re-

205. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
206. See ILL. DEPT. CORRECnONS,
"institution credits" removing up to
spend in order for him to be eligible
fusal of parole.
207. These credits are also subject to revocation for subsequent violation of institutional rules of conduct.
208. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(c) (Supp. 1972).
209. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 108, §§ 45, 47 (1971).
210. ILL. DEPT. CORREIc'ONs, Reg. No. 805 (1970):
The following acts or actions by inmates in Adult correctional institutions
will be considered violations of rules and/or regulations:
. Disobeying any order from any institutional employee or any prison
rule.
2.
Being disrespectful to any employee of the institution or to any person
visiting the institution.
3. Refusing properly authorized work and/or housing assignments; carelessness or negligence of work or refusal to work.
4. Swearing, cursing, or use of any other vulgar, abusive, insolent,
threatening, or improper language toward any other inmate or employee or indecency inlanguage, action, or gesture at any time.
5. Assaulting an employee or inmate or fighting with an inmate or employee.
6. Leaving a cell, a place of assignment, or other appointed place without permission.
7. Willfully disfiguring or damaging any part of the institution or any
materials, tools, or machinery.
8. Committing of any mutinous act, inciting to riot and/or general disturbance in any part of the institution or on any work assignment.
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the violation of which can result in reclassification, loss of privileges, confinement in an isolation cell ("hole"), loss of good time
credit or reassignment to an administrative segregation wing of the

institution. A finding of guilty on any of the twenty-nine major
offenses also,211 in addition to the above sanctions, substantially reduces the inmate's prospect for receiving parole.
9.

Using intoxicants, being under the influence of any kind of drug or
medication not prescribed by institutional personnel, or having possession of narcotics, barbiturates and/or amphetamines.
10. Making or having possession of any kind of dangerous weapon.
11. Failing to report to a work assignment and/or any destination without
authorized permission or excuse.
12. Possessing U.S. currency, coin or paper, without authorization.
13. Forging or altering a pass.
14. Giving false information to an employee.
15. Passing or receiving contraband from another inmate, visitor and/or
employee.
16. Gambling of any type.
17. Possessing a syringe and/or needle.
18. Possessing controlled medication without prescription and authorization from an institutional medical official.
19. Forging a request of any type, i.e. check requests, commissary orders,
etc.
20. Stealing and/or unauthorized possession of State property or property
of employees or other inmates.
21. Making unauthorized telephone calls from a place of work to persons
outside the institution or within the institution.
22. Stealing or giving away unauthorized food or medication.
23. Obtaining or attempting to obtain unauthorized medication.
24. Refusing to keep person or housing assignment clean and tidy.
25. Violating the General Laws of the State.
26. Engaging in or pressuring others to engage in any unnatural sexual
activity.
27. Gathering around an employee in a threatening or intimidating
manner.
28. Smoking in unauthorized areas.
29. Tattooing the body or piercing the ears.
211. Inmates are given a "ticket" by a correctional officer, following which, the
inmate appears before the above mentioned disciplinary board. The various offenses
are not defined for use by the officer or inmate. However, the Correctional Officers
Training Guide, prepared by the American Correctional Association, provides future officers with the following striking aid:
Some Types of "Problem" Inmates
Following are some of the types of problem inmates encountered in a
correctional institution. Each requires understanding and a different approach in disciplinary training. The employee must know the men he
is dealing with and must shape his disciplinary techniques accordingly.
1. Indifferent; disinterested.
11. Rash, careless, impatient.
2. Lazy.
12. Slow, dull, stupid.
3. Nervous; irritable.
13. Sick, physically-mentally.
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In the Miller, Green and Thomas cases, each plaintiff had suffered
the revocation of accumulated good time credits of varying
amounts2 12 following the alleged violation of institutional rules. In
each of these cases, the revocation took place prior to the redrafting
of disciplinary procedures which became effective on December
1, 1970. Those procedures provide for a hearing on the charge
before a three-man board, composed of two members of the security
staff and one social service staff member.21 3 This procedure, in the
same basic form, is now embodied in section 1003-8-7 of the Unified Code of Corrections.2 1 4
The plaintiffs alleged a denial of due process in the manner in
which their respective credits were revoked on the basis that no
prior notice of the offense was given; that there was no opportunity
to confront their accusers, cross-examine them or call witnesses in
their own behalf; that there was an absence of counsel or substitute counsel; and finally, the absence of a written record.
The court began its analysis by noting the recent unanimous decision by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer,21 5
which held that parole revocation is a deprivation of liberty within
the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
and that accordingly certain procedural safeguards must attend
state action in such proceedings.21 6 While holding that the Morris4. Stubborn; obstinate.
5. Conceited; Big Shot
6. Hot tempered.
7. Shy, uncertain; lacks confidence.
8. Crank; suspicious.
9. Thoughtless; selfish.
10. Aggressive; bellicose.
AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION,

14.

Troubled with domestic problems.
15. Politician; thinks he has "pull."
16. Hysterical; emotional.
17. Chronic griper; agitator.
18. Talkative; garrulous.
19. Yard Lawyer; writ writer.
20. Sly, sneaky, furtive.
CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS

TRAINING GUIDE,

at 60.
212. Miller lost ninety days, Green twenty-one months and Thomas one month.
213. This procedure is common in most state prisons and is recommended by the
American Correctional Association. See AMERICAN CORRECTION ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 410-11 (College Park, Maryland, 1972).
214. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-8-7(a)-(e) (Supp. 1972).
215.

408 U.S. 471 (1972).

216. The Court there held that due process at its minimum required the following at parole revocation hearings: (a) written notice of the claimed violation of
parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of the evidence against him; (c) opportunity to
be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless refused for good cause
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sey case was not dispositive of the cases at issue, the court concluded

that it did sound the death knell for the wide-open discretion formally allotted correctional officials in the past.217 While cautioning as in Morales that such a position does not mean a review of
every decision made by seasoned prison administrators, 218 it does
require scrutiny for any "grievous loss" of liberty suffered by a pris-

on inmate at the hands of institutional officials.
Noting that when an inmate may enjoy liberty is directly affected
by the disallowance of good time credits,219 the court concluded that
such equals "the greivous loss" suffered by a parolee on revocation and thus required the presence of due process standards. While

rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the rights of confrontation,
cross-examination and counsel or substitute counsel 220 were essential to any proceeding in which good time may be revoked, the
court held:
shown); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body; and (f) a written statement by
the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the revocation.
Id. at 489.
217. In view of the fact that physical confinement is merely one species of
legal custody, we are persuaded that Morrissey actually portends a more
basic conceptual holding: liberty protected by the due process clause mayindeed must to some extent-coexist with legal custody pursuant to conviction. The deprivation of liberty following an adjudication of guilt is
partial, not total. A residuum of constitutionally protected rights remains.
479 F.2d at 712.
218. This does not mean, however, that every decision by prison officials
should be subject to judicial review or that the courts rather than experienced administrators should write prison regulations. Morrissey reminds
us that due process is a flexible concept which takes account of the importance of the interests at stake; thus, it is abundantly clear that a myriad
of problems of prison administration must remain beyond the scope of
proper judicial concern.
479 F.2d at 713.
219. The court failed to indicate the devastating effect such revocations have
on parole opportunities, making such determinations akin to parole revocation hearings themselves. In addition, such revocation can and does alter an inmate's institutional classification which may dramatically affect the conditions of confinement
as well as its length.
220. In relation to counsel or substitute counsel, the court first disagreed with
the proposition that whatever procedural safeguards are required for a parole or probation hearing are also required in an in-prison disciplinary hearing. Secondly, the
court indicated that Morrissey itself does not require it. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1003-3-9 (Supp. 1973). Under present practice, the Illinois Parole and Pardon Board permits parolees to be represented by counsel. Section 1003-3-2(f) provides for use of the Board's subpoena power to compel attendance of witnesses and
to produce documentary evidence. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-2 (Supp.
1973).
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Plainly, an in-prison disciplinary proceeding may be at least as informal
as a parole revocation hearing. Thus, there is no absolute right to confront or to cross-examine witnesses; it is doubtful that counsel or a lay
substitute is essential. At a minimum, however, the prisoner must receive
adequate advanced written notice of the charges against him, he must be
afforded a fair opportunity to explain his version of the incident and, insure a degree of impartiality, the factual determination must be made by
221
a person or persons other than the officer who reported the infraction.

This ruling relating to the procedures required at any prison disciplinary hearing prior to the imposition of sanctions amounting to a

"grievous loss" is in keeping with the philosophy of other federal
circuits, 222 several of which require the additional relief requested by
Miller, Green and Thomas. 2 The new Illinois Unified Code of Convictions, enacted and effective prior to this decision, reflects this ruling to the letter in section 1003-8-7(e).24

Currently, the revoca-

221. 479 F.2d at 715-16. Correctional officials are particularly concerned lest
courts see the disciplinary hearing as a trial. The over-riding authority of the
officer and the general acceptance of his written version of the event could be
severely hampered by the presence of counsel, fact-finding, and meaningful crossexamination:
The administrative problems involved in having staff members and inmates at the hearing and the possibility of feelings of hate and resentment
by the inmate against those testifying makes this practice undesirable in
most cases. The soundest practice is to have a staff member investigate
and report his findings to the disciplinary officer, including statements of
witnesses, where applicable, for use at the time of hearings. In short,
the hearing should be an orderly attempt to arrive at the truth and is not a
formal court proceeding. As much of the inmate's case history and record
of adjustment as is pertinent should be taken into account and not merely
his criminal history and previous infractions.
MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 215 at 410.
222. See, e.g., Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971); Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966);
Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967), rev'd on other grounds.
223. See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971). The State of Ohio by recent
departmental regulation provides like procedures. OHIo DEPT. CORRECTIONS, Reg.
No. 805(a) (1972).
224. (e) In disciplinary cases which may involve the imposition of disciplinary isolation, the loss of good time credit or eligibility to earn good
time credit, or a change in work, education, or other program assignment
of more than 7 days duration, the Director shall establish disciplinary procedures consistent with the following principles:
(1) Any person or persons who initiate a disciplinary charge against
a person shall not determine the disposition of the charge. The Director may establish one or more disciplinary boards to hear and determine charges. To the extent possible, a person representing the counseling staff of the institution or facility shall participate in determining
the disposition of the disciplinary case.
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tion of good time credits is implemented by an institutional Merit
Staff2 25 upon the recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee
following a finding of an infraction of a rule(s), where deemed

appropriate. Merit Staff procedures also substantially comply with
the courts ruling in Miller v. Twomey. 22
Regarding the claims in Krause and Armstrong, relative to the

placement of complainants in punitive isolation and a "Special
Program Unit" without a prior hearing meeting the due process
standards,22 7 the court reiterated its conclusions as to the spirit of
Morrissey and addressed the respondents' argument that certain

emergency situations 228 warranted immediate action without the need
for a full-scale hearing.

On this issue, the court stated:

A good faith determination that immediate action is necessary to forestall
a riot outweighs the interest in accurate determination of individual culpability before taking precautionary steps. Indeed, even in many of the
minor decisions that guards must make as problems suddenly confront
(2) Any committed person charged with a violation of Department
rules of behavior shall be given notice of the charge including a statement
of the misconduct alleged and of the rules this conduct is alleged to
violate.
(3) Any person charged with a violation of rules is entitled to a
hearing on that charge at which time he shall have an opportunity to
appear before and address the person or persons deciding the charge.
(4) The person or persons determining the disposition of the charge
may also summon to testify any witnesses or other persons with relevant
knowledge of the incident. The person charged may be permitted to
question any person so summoned.
(5) If the charge is sustained, the person charged is entitled to a
written statement of the decision by the persons determining the disposition of the charge which shall include the basis for the decision and
the disciplinary action, if any, to be imposed.
ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-7(e) (Supp. 1973).
225. ILL. DEPT. CosncrRoNs, Reg. No. 812 (1970).
226. "The inmate may submit a written statement to the Merit Staff, and the
inmate must be given the opportunity to personally appear before the Merit Staff.
The Merit Staff shall base its decision on the inmate's record." Id. at para. 6.
227. Krause also raised the revocation of his good time credit as in the Miller,
Green and Thomas cases.
228. In Krause, following a disturbance in a dining hall, in which windows were
brokn, fires set and other inmates and personnel hurt, Krause and co-plaintiff Moore
were, without a hearing, placed in "indefinite lower segregation."
In Armstrong, he and other named plaintiffs representing a class, were placed
in the "Special Program Unit" at the Joliet Penitentiary, following a violent disturbance at the baseball field. After an in-house determination by officials as to
the culpable inmates, the transfer was effected without individual determinations of
guilt or compliaty.
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them in their daily routines, the state's interest in maintaining disciplined
229
order outweighs the individual's interest in perfect justice.

The court went on to note however, that in cases involving the
type of violence instanced in the Krause and Armstrong cases,23 °
where the emergency has passed, the individual's interest in a fair
evaluation of the facts increases over the corresponding state interest in prompt disciplinary action. Accordingly, the court held:
In any
minimum
cation of
notice of
witnesses

case which 'may involve "grievous loss," we believe the bare
is that applicable to a proceeding which may result in the revostatutory good time, namely, an adequate and timely written
the charge, a fair opportunity to explain and to request that
231
be called or interviewed, and an impartial decision maker.

Thus, as previously noted, 232 any Illinois in-prison proceeding, the

result of which may amount to a "grievous loss" to the affected prisoner, must be accompanied by the above delineated procedural
23 3

steps.

Finally, in relation to the eighth amendment issue of the responsibility of prison officials for injuries suffered at the hands of other
inmates, raised in Gutierrez, the court sided with institutional of229. 479 F.2d at 717.
230. The trial court in Armstrong ruled that confinement in the Special Program Unit was not for rehabilitative purposes as contended by respondent and
found that it was a form of punishment, thus raising constitutional issues. Admission to the Unit is governed by Department Regulation and was deemed by counsel to be an instance of the growing unconstitutional use of "behavior modification" facilities as punishment for political activity in U.S. state and federal penitentiaries. See ILL. DEPT. CORRECTIONS, Reg. No. 808 (1970):
A Special Program Unit has been established at the Joliet Branch of the
Illinois State Penitentiary where inmates, who clearly demonstrate an inability or an unwillingness to adjust satisfactorily and derive measurable
benefits from programs of the various Adult Division institutions, may be
transferred. This unit is designed to deal with inmates presenting special
behavioral problems through intensive therapeutic techniques ...
No inmate may be retained in the Special Program Unit for more than
one year without the approval of the Administrator of Program Services,
who will base his decision on a complete written report submitted to the
Administrator of Program Services annually, as long as the inmate is retained in this program.
231. 479 F.2d at 718. Judge Doyle's order which required confrontation, crossexamination and counsel or substitute counsel in future Wisconsin disciplinary
hearings was modified accordingly.
232. See text accompanying notes 212-15, supra.
233. It should be noted however, that the court did not address itself to the
punishments imposed per se, but merely conditioned the application of the particular sanctions involved. Challenges to the sanctions proper remain for future
litigation in this field.
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ficials. Gutierrez was severely beaten by a fellow inmate and
claimed that the officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punish-

ment in violation of the eighth amendment due to their negligent
failure to segregate the other prisoner from the general population."3 4
The issue was whether the acceptance of the foreseeable risks

of violence which are involved in a decision to permit a potentially
dangerous inmate to associate with the general population subjects
a correctional officer to section 1983 liability when such violence
occurs. Due to the potential impact that a reply in the affirmative
would have on the entire correctional machinery, the court affirmed

the dismissal of the complaint, stating:
Though the analogy is not decisive of this case, we note that plaintiff's
theory, if valid, might require parole boards to defend their exercise of
discretion when the ever-present risk of recidivism materializes and a
parolee commits a foreseeable attack on another citizen. Even if the
defense of good faith is adequate to defeat such claims, the introduction
of judicial review would inevitably inhibit the exercise of discretion.
Within the prison itself the warden and his agents must also be permitted a wide area of unreviewable discretion. The proper placement or
classification of the especially dangerous inmate should not present him
with a Hobson's choice between alternative Eighth Amendment claims;
segregation on the basis of mere suspicion or inadequate history of violence
might have subjected him to a claim by

. .

. Gutierrez.

23 5

Accordingly, it was held that even assuming that the error in judgment was attributable to negligence, such an allegation is insufficient to describe a violation of the eighth amendment and hence the
plaintiff clearly could not recover damages under section 1983.230
234. It was alleged that the other inmate's prior history and his general reputation among inmates put the defendants on notice of the risk that he might engage
in acts of violence. The court ruled that an examination of the records regarding
the attacker justified the allegations of foreseeability on plaintiff's part.
235. 479 F.2d at 721.
236. See the opinion of Swygert, Chief Judge, dissenting in part, which takes the
majority in Miller to task for placing fetters on the full implications of Morrissey.
Attempts at a solution to the ever present factor of inmate versus inmate violence
create incredibly complex problems for inmates, administrators and courts alike.
The prospect of isolating potentially violence prone inmates under any criterionwhich assumedly would be as dubious as those standards used to justify long term
isolation-would result in the need for even closer daily supervision than is presently given, thus further reducing the small kernel of privacy available to prisoners.
In turn, lower level officials and correctional officers would be faced with the need
to make continuing judgments, the subtlety of which, in light of their other duties
and inadequate training in this regard, belies the prospect. The practical effect of
such determinations and accompanying action would be to eliminate to varying degrees, the privileges, training and parole opportunities of those selected, thus further
exacerbating the original dilemma.
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The final case to be analyzed, Adams v. Carlson,23 7 was a class
action initiated under 42 U.S.C. §1983, by certain inmates of the
federal penitentiary at Marion, Illinois. The plaintiffs, following a
denial of their motion for an injunction, raised four basic claims for
relief: that placement of class members in segregated confinement
violated their rights under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment; that the indefinite segregated confinement involved
was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment; and that designated official actions interfered with the plaintiffs access to court and counsel in contravention of their rights
under the sixth amendment.
Following a general work stoppage and subsequent disturbance,
approximately eighty-six prisoners were placed in segregated confinement. Afterwards, Marion officials convened a disciplinary
committee to finalize the dispositions already made.2"8 Each inmate was orally informed of the charge against him, told the name
of the accusing officer and allowed to comment on the charge.
The inmates were not told who gathered the information supporting the charge. On this basis, the committee made their judgment.
Upon a finding of guilty, indefinite segregation was imposed as punishment. The affected inmates were not given advance notice of the
charges nor were they theretofore provided with official definitions
of the various offenses alleged.2 39 Approximately eleven months
in segregation were served by part of the class.
Judge Swygert, speaking for the majority on the issue of the con237.
238.
1970):

No. 72-153 (7th Cir., Aug. 23, 1973).
See MARION PENITENTIARY, POLICY

STATEMENT

MI-7400.5B

(Oct.

19,

ADJUSTMENT COMMITTEE.
Adjustment Committee membership includes the Chief Correctional Supervisor, Chairman, Correctional Supervisor of the Unit, and Caseworker from the Classification and Parole section and the Associate Warden serving in Advisory Capacity. It is their
responsibility to receive and investigate misconduct reports, conduct hearings, make findings and impose effective goal-oriented disciplinary action.

All major misconduct reports will be referred to the Adjustment Committee. Following action by the Adjustment Committee, the Associate
Warden and Warden will review the disposition.
239. At the time involved, prison regulations did not provide for advance notice, but simply required that the officer notify the shift supervisor and prepare a
written report of the incident. See MARION PENITENTIARY, POLICY STATEMENT MI7400.5B (Oct. 19, 1970).

1973]

CRIMINAL LAW-POST-TRIAL

PHASE

299

stitutionality of the above proceedings, began by noting that the district court's ruling, rendered before the court's decision in Miller
was based on Adams v. Pate,240 decided by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1971, which decision did not require the procedural steps mandated in Miller.2 41 Thus, the basic issue was the
retroactive application of the Miller criterion to these prison rules
infraction board proceedings.
In response to the government's argument that such a ruling
would violate the traditional proscription in criminal cases against
retroactivity, the court noted the position of the United States Supreme Court which has held that the Constitution neither prohibits
or requires retroactivity of new principles 24 2 and that the greater the
effect of a decision on the basic integrity of the fact-finding process,
the greater the burden on the government to establish that the retroactive application would result in a "probable and extensive disruption of the administration of criminal justice."24
Such integrity
was found to be greatly effected on the instant case. Also, the fact
that the type of hearing at issue is civil rather than criminal in nature
and that an administrative board rather than a court renders the
verdict were not deemed persuasive. 44 Accordingly, retroactivity
was ordered, thus requiring rehearings in each of the cases involved:
A rehearing under Miller is a much less complex and time-consuming
matter than a criminal retrial. Moreover, a Miller rehearing raises a relatively minor problem of lost or forgetful witnesses since it is fair to say
that segregation is typically a shorter affair by far than the term of a
245
criminal sentence.

The case was remanded to determine, as with the Miller remand,
the extent to which the delineated standards required enlargement
or clarification, and thus whether new hearings were to be ordered.
240. 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971).
241. It was also noted that the procedures found on the district level to be in
compliance with Pate were formulated after the dispositions at issue. Thus the
court in the instant case had to determine whether the original proceedings met due
process standards.
242. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
243. No. 72-153 at 9.
244. "What a prisoner suffers upon segregation, then, differs from what
he suffered upon conviction by shades of degree, not of kind." No. 72-153 at 12.
245. Id. at 13.
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As to the appellants' position that their indefinite segregation

amounted to cruel and unusual punishment per se, the court initially
determined that the scheme of indefinite segregation240 employed
at Marion was not unconstitutional on its face.247 The constitutional
246. It is important to distinguish "disciplinary isolation" from the concept of
"administrative segregation." The former is imposed due to rules infractions, for
short periods, in a range from several days to two weeks in an isolation cell without normal cell privileges. Administrative isolation results in the affected inmate
being removed from the general prison population for periods of years in some
instances. The standards utilized suffer the same lack of definitional content as
most other prison rules that affect the daily lives of inmates.
See, e.g., ILL. DEPT. CORRECTION, Reg. No. 807(1-2) (1970):
Segregation is a classification category for inmates in Adult Division institutions. Inmates may be placed in a segregation classification by the Institutional Assignment Committee or Program Team if they:
1. Indicate a chronic inability to adjust in the general prison population.
2. Constitute a serious threat to the security of the institution.
3. Require maximum protection for themselves or if others require maximum protection from them.
Inmates placed in segregation retain most normal cell privileges but are in effect, cut
off from other human contact:
Inmates assigned to a segregation classification are subject to the following
controls and privileges:
1. Housing in a separate area of the institution determined by the Chief
Administrative Officer;
2. Work involving only routine housekeeping duties;
3. Three meals a day-served in cells;
4. Television and/or radio privileges may be denied by the Chief Administrative Officer;
5. No institutional activities enjoyed by the general population;
6. Regular mail privileges;
7. Chaplains will visit the segregation area regularly or upon request;
8. Visits will be in a separate visiting room and will be conducted in the
presence of an officer;
9. Showers are to be provided at least once each week, and normal toilet
articles are to be provided;
10. Referrals to the physician or dentist upon request or for medical emergencies;
11. The opportunity to exercise for a period of one hour either indoors or
outdoors when the security of the institution is not jeopardized;
12. Regular commissary order-which will be delivered to the segregation
unit-unless an inmate is out of grade;
13. Clothing is to be issued;
14. A reasonable amount of reading material and educational materials approved by the Education Department;
15. Bedding is to be changed weekly and weekly laundry services are to
be provided;
16. Access to the Law library.
Id. Review of this classification is had by an Assignment Committee every 90 days.
Segregation of more than one year must be approved by the chief administrative
officer after a personal interview.
247. The court noted that, as in Illinois state penitentiaries, periodic review was
had by inmates placed in segregated confinement. See MARION PENITENTIARY, POL-
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issue relevant to any eighth amendment disposition was whether the
punishment meted out was disproportionate to the determined rules
infraction.24 Disproportionality, the court continued, is a question
of fact and since the record was incomplete in that regard, the
eleven months confinement at issue could not, other than on remand be found disproportionate and hence, in violation of the
eighth amendment.
On the issues of access to court and counsel, the court was asked

to rule on the constitutional propriety, under the sixth amendment,
of the construction of a glass partition in the attorney visiting room,
which limited the contact to telephone communications, and the
seizure and non-return of the legal papers of those placed in segre-

gation.249 The overall reaction of the court, as in most cases involving access to legal counsel, was firm and cogent:
Citation of authority is hardly needed for the proposition that an inmate's right of unfettered access to the courts is as fundamental a right as
any other he may hold [citations omitted]. All other rights of an inmate
existence on the
are illusory without it, being entirely dependent for their
250
whim or caprice of the prison warden [citations omitted].

However, the court noted that the partition in question affected
MI-7400.5C (July 17, 1972):
Adjustment Committees will meet no less than three times a week. All
inmates in segregation status will be reviewed at least once a week on the
record. At the time of this review, the Committee will determine if any
program changes are needed, and will document the record accordingly.
Every inmate who spends over ten continuous days in segregation will
have his case formally reviewed by the Committee a second time and this
review will be repeated at least every 30 days thereafter that the inmate
remains in segregation. This means that the Committee will have the inmate appear before them or if the circumstances so dictate, the Committee
will visit the inmate where he is being confined. If commitment to segregation continues beyond 30 days there will be a psychiatric or psychological
interview. This interview and report should address itself particularly to
the threat the inmate poses to himself or to others. The Committee's overall evaluation should also comment on the inmate's effect on the security
or orderly operation of the institution. A similar interview and report
shall be made no later than each six months thereafter.
The 10 day and 30 day reviews will be documented along with the
Committee findings or decisions and will be sent to the next highest authority for review. . . . A copy of the 30 day review will be sent to the
Assistant Director of Institutional Services.
248. No. 72-153 at 24-7.
249. These precautions were taken in response to further disturbances, cell fires
set by inmates and a series of searches that produced a loaded weapon and gunpowder.
250. No. 72-153 at 17.
ICY
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the ease of attorney-client communication and was not a total prohibition or denial of access in a traditional sense. Hence, the partition arrangement per se did not violate a fundamental right. Nevertheless, in keeping with the balancing test enunciated in Morales,
the court found that the justifications offered by the governmentthe fear of attorneys smuggling in contraband weapons-did not
amount to a rational basis reasonably related to the security of the
institution. Accordingly, the district court was ordered to enjoin
any further restrictions of the type at issue and ordered the removal
of the partition.
On similar reasoning, the court ordered the return of appellant's
legal materials previously confiscated and held by Marion officials.
In addition to the general position of the Supreme Court as to the
necessity of providing inmates reasonable access to law books and
other law related documents,2 51 the rationale given by the officialsthat such might be used to start future fires-was deemed "dubious" at best.252
The recurring theme, evident in the three cases discussed above,
is one of extreme caution. The Seventh Circuit can be expected in
the future to continue its hesitant approach to constitutional claims
of prisoners, which approach, under the "rational basis" test enunciated in Morales, demonstrates that the traditional "hands-off"
doctrine has yet to receive a decent burial.

251. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 110 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aft'd
sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
252. A vital right of appellants is at stake. Without proof of its justification
by the Government, we must resolve doubts in favor of appellants. If
however, an inmate has displayed a marked propensity toward arson or suicide by fire . . . and if the prison warden has removed from his cell and

replaced all flammable necessities of life, his access to, and not possession
of, personal legal materials may be justifiable.
No. 72-153 at 23 n.27.

